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In the U. s., a significant amount of income is redistributed 
through transfers in both the public and private sectors. Although 
there has been a great deal of attention focused on public transfers, 
the role of private transfers, and their interaction with public 
transfers, have been relatively neglected. The objective of this study 
is to evaluate and compare both types of transfers. This chapter begins 
with a discussion of the criteria used for this evaluation, followed by 
a brief statement of the nature of the problem, and the purposes, and 
organization of the study. 
The Criteria 
In general, to evaluate income transfers, the criteria employed are 
adequacy, equity, efficiency and effects on capacity output.I Effi-
ciency includes: (a) technical efficiency (transfers should be managed 
at the least cost, and we should spend the least amount on transfers 
while still achieving social goals), (b) allocative efficiency (the 
aggregate level of income transfers should be Pareto optimal), and 
!Lampman (1972) specifies that there are four competing mentalities 
in making the-income transfer decision: the minimum-provision mentality, 
the replacement of loss mentality, the horizontal and vertical equity 
mentality, and the efficiency of investment mentality. The criteria 
here are mainly derived from Report of Joint Economic Committee (1974). 
1 
(c) other efficiency (social welfare losses caused by transfers should 
be reduced or eliminated2). This study will address the technical and 
2 
allocative efficiencies of public and private transfers with respect to 
income redistribution. Specifically, we focus on ways to improve income 
equality in an aggregate sense; namely, the relative advantages of 
privately funded income transfers as against publicly funded programs in 
achieving an efficient redistribution of income and supply of transfer 
incomes are examined. 
In the dispensation of benefits, both public and private income 
transfers have features that are detrimental to achieving the objective 
of reducing poverty and income inequality. The alimony and child sup-
port payments involved with divorce decrees do not necessarily represent 
an income transfer from the rich to the poor. In addition, gifts and 
estates do not necessarily convey the message of philanthropy. It is 
easy to imagine that a significant part of inter-family transfers would 
go to persons associated with the donors genetically or socially. For 
some voluntary charitable activities, transfers are from lower to higher 
income people. In the United Way, for example, contributions from lower 
income people are used to support the Boy Scouts, medical research, and 
2There are other efficiency problems caused by income transfers. 
Many students have assumed that transfers are costless economically and 
raise essentially noneconomic problems. Tullock (197lb) argues that the 
transfers, either public or private, may be costless, but that transfers 
lead to conflict, and the investment of resources in obtaining transfers 
or attempting to avoid transfers being taken away represent net social 
waste. In voluntary charity, the takers would invest resources in 
becoming a more suitable object of charitable activity and the givers 
would try to avoid its happening. In public transfers, the conflicts 
could be envisioned in the form of lobbying costs people spend. While 
income transfer may create welfare losses (Browning, 1978), transfers may 
also increase efficiency--e.g., improved job-worker matches (Danzinger, 
Haveman, and Plotnick, 1981). 
3 
other organizations and activities which benefit higher income people. 
As for the public income transfers, transfers through the political 
process are related to political power and, consequently, are generally 
to politically powerful groups not defined by income, including farmers, 
college students, older people, and "the intellectual class" (Tullock, 
1971a, p. 383). Director's Law of Public Expenditures indicates that 
the primary beneficiary of income transfers is the middle class, not the 
poor. 3 In reality, transfers occur through a wide variety of programs, 
but the groups benefitting from these programs are often not defined by 
income. 
As for the supply of income transfers, according to Friedman 
(1962), the poor would receive a sub-optimal amount of redistribution 
through private charity. This implies that the greater equality of 
income may be in the nature of public goods. Charity indicates utility 
interdependence, which, in turn, generates an externality. Thus, by 
uncoordinated individual activity, income transfers will not be suffi-
ciently provided; there is an allocative efficiency problem. In com-
parison with private transfers, public transfers will not have this 
problem, no matter what philosophies they are based on--a matter of 
legal right or charity.4 Therefore, in examining allocative efficiency 
3The philosophy of Director's,Law is as follows. Government has 
coercive power, which allows it to engage in acts which could not be 
performed by voluntary agreement of the members of a society. Any 
portion of the society which can secure control of the state's machinery 
will employ the machinery to improve its own position. Under some 
conditions, this dominant group will be the middle income classes. For 
details, see Stigler (1970). 
4orr (1976) concludes that the public goods theory of income trans-
fers perfectly explains the reality of AFDC programs. But Tullock 
(197lb, p. 637) contends that "the government income redistribution 
is carried well beyond the point where those who are paying for the 
of income transfers, only private income transfers will be covered. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to differentiate the insurance type from 
welfare type of private transfers.5 Economic theory (Rea, 1981) sug-
gests that the decision to purchase insurance is just like any consump-
tion decision. The only difference is that the insurance decision 
involves a choice between the amount of utility the consumer will have 
under each alternative outcome or state of nature. Through the free 
market mechanism, Pareto optimality could be obtained. Therefore, the 
allocative efficiency of income transfers should be limited to the wel-
fare type of private income transfers. 
In summary, there are problems of market failure and government 
failure in income redistribution. The possible free-rider problem may 
result in a sub-optimal supply of private transfers. Some features of 
private transfers may make the redistribution from the rich to the poor 
trivial in amount. All these seem to lead to a conclusion that private 
transfers are associated with both technical and allocative inefficien-
cies in income redistribution. However, there is strong evidence that 
some government redistribution takes place within the middle class. 
Therefore, any assessment of private transfers logically requires an 
assessment of the non-market failures associated with public transfers. 
4 
4(continued) redistribution benefit in utility" and the view of 
Pareto optimal redistribution only explains a small amount of government 
redistribution. Kennett (1980b, p. 343), in the second part of a series 
of papers discussing altruism and economic behavior, says that "the size 
of the Welfare State should not be perceived as being motivated by an 
increase in collective altruism. In a real sense it is in response to a 
demand from below, rather than the result of sympathy from above." 
5rncome transfers can be divided into two categories--insurance 
(contributory), where the recipient has contributed to the funds, and 
welfare (non-contributory), where the funds are provided entirely by 
someone other than recipient. 
5 
In this study, the effects caused by revenues to finance these transfers 
will be neglected intentionally. In addition, only money income trans-
fers are considered. 
Brief Statement of the Problem 
In recent years there have been many studies on the income redis-
tribution effect of government income transfers. Some of the studies 
are those by Gottschalk (1981); Smeeding (1977, 1979, 1981); Danziger 
(1977); Danziger and Plotnick (1977); Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick 
(1980); Browning (1976, 1979);· Benus and Morgan (1975); anti Reynolds and 
Smolensky (1977, 1978). Despite substantial variation with respect to 
the income unit, income definition, income accounting period, valuation 
of in-kind benefits, and choice of ranking methodology, these studies 
are in basic agreement that the redistribution impact of various qovern-
ment transfer programs has increased over time, but not as rapidly as 
the increase in transfer expenditures (Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick, 
1981). However, although the literature has steadily improver! due to 
new data sets and econometric advances, there is no unanimity of agree-
ment on the magnitude of this effect. 
Furthermore, these redistribution studies do not adjust for the 
replacement of public by private income transfers in the absence of the 
former. This leads to two questions: 
1. Is there a difference between the redistribution effects of 
public and private income transfers and how larqe is this 
difference? 
2. Is there some substitution between public and private income 
transfers, and how large is this effect? 
Surprisingly, there have been only a few studies (Morgan, David, 
Cohen, and Brazer, 1962; Lampman, 1972, 1982; Vickery, 1962; Kennett, 
1980a, 1980b) of the comparison of the redistributive effects of 
6 
public and private income transfers. Furthermore, in addition to some 
casual observations, the existing studies rely on relatively simple cal-
culations on aggregate or micro-data bases to derive the magnitude of 
the redistributive effects. For example, after transfers are distrib-
uted, these authors either compare the pretransfer income with the post-
transfer income for the lowest quintile of population or compare the 
Gini coefficients between pre- and posttransfer incomes. As a result, 
the range of estimated redistributive effects is quite narrow. 
Furthermore, the resulting estimates are highly aggregated; of the 
total redistributive effect we do not know how much should be attributed 
to the variation in the overall level of transfers, how much should be 
attributed to the change in the degree of transfer progressivity,6 what 
the effect is of the interaction between the overall transfer level and 
the degree of progressivity in terms of income redistribution, and how 
this interaction can be captured in a more systematic way. These are 
problems which have not been resolved. 
There are several studies on the determinants of private charitable 
giving, of which the public income transfer is considered to be an ele-
ment. Among these studies are those by Schwartz (1970), Nelson (1975), 
Abrams and Schmitz (1981), and Reece (1979). The empirical results, 
however, have failed to show clearly the nature of the relationship 
between public social welfare expenditures and private charitable giving, 
6The degree of transfer progressivity refers to the distribution of 
transfer payments, as measured by a concentration ratio. 
7 
In addition, the discussion of private philanthropy gives rise to an 
immediate question of the public goods character of private charitable 
activity. Suppose that the concern about others is an argument in an 
individual's utility function. Is the consumption of this 11 concern 11 
non-rival? Is exclusion possible? If it is in the nature of a public 
good and Pareto optimality is used as a guide to income redistribution, 
the optimal transfer mechanism would be governmental redistributive 
activities, rather than private ones. There has been considerable con-
troversy among economists on this subject {Thurow, 1971; Hochman, 1972; 
Hochman and Rodgers, 1969, 1973, 1974; Von Furstenberg and Mueller, 
1971; Becker, 1974; Orr, 1976; Pasour, 1981; Mckenzie, 1981; Warr, 1982; 
Sugden, 1982; Ben-Zion and Spiegel, 1983). Despite the controversies, 
the previous studies all focus on the giving side of private philan-
thropy, leaving out the receiving side; i.e., they neglect distribution-
al aspect of private giving. People not only decide how much they will 
give to others, but they also decide how this giving will be allocated 
among many recipients. Furthermore, the relationship between public 
welfare expenditures and private giving has been ingeniously connected 
in the public goods theory of private giving. However, testing of this 
theory has been limited to the case of utility interdependence, which is 
only one of three assumptions that can be employed in the public goods 
theory of private giving. 
Purposes of the Study 
This study is an attempt to address the shortcomings and contro-
versial issues discussed above. The first purpose of this study is to 
review and evaluate the literature on redistributive effects and to 
develop a theoretical model for decomposing the total effect on distri-
bution into the separate effects of transfer progressivity, the overall 
level of transfers, and the underlying distribution of income. 
8 
The redistributive effect of private income transfers is a subject 
which has been relatively neglected, to my knowledge. But it is an 
alternative to public income transfers as a means of redistributing 
income. Thus, any full assessment of the redistributive effect of 
public income transfers must also consider the impact of private income 
transfers. In this study, a decomposition rule is developed for this 
purpose, and a thorough comparison of public and private cash income 
transfers, in terms of their redistributive effect, will be accomplished. 
This part, in other words, focuses on the technical efficiency of income 
transfers in achieving the objective of reducing income inequality. 
The traditional economic analysis of private giving will also be 
reviewed and evaluated, and some modifications and extensions of this 
analysis will be made. This study focuses specifically on those private 
gifts which result in cash income transfers and will examine the substi-
tution relationship between public cash income transfers and private 
cash welfare income transfers. As opposed to the private insurance 
income transfers, the private welfare income transfers may take on the 
character of public goods. This matters very much for policy in light 
of the efficiency differences in income redistribution between public 
and private income transfers. By this undert~king, both the substitu-
tion relationship between public cash income transfers and private cash 
welfare income transfers and the public goods character of private cash 
9 
welfare income transfers can be examined simultaneously.7 This part, in 
other words, focuses on the allocative efficiency aspects of private wel-
fare income transfers in relation to income redistribution. 
Organization of the Study 
The chapters of this study are organized as follows. Chapter II 
reviews and evaluates the previous studies on the redistributive effects 
of public and private income transfers and the public goods character of 
private charitable giving. Chapter III explains the methodology 
employed in this study. Chapter IV develops theoretical models of 
income transfers for comparing the efficiency of public and private 
income transfers in achieving the goal of reducing inequality and for 
analyzing private welfare income transfers. Chapter V presents the 
regression equations and describes the data sources and variables used 
in the study. Chapter VI presents the empirical results. Chapter VII 
provides a brief summary and conclusion of the study. 
7The interrelationship between public income maintenance benefits 
and private insurance will not be discussed here. There has been some 
analysis (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972;.Rea, 1974, 1981; Musgrave, 1968) of 
the impact of the public welfare programs on the decision to purchase 
insurance against loss of income. Rea (1981) has demonstrated that 
income-tested welfare programs will induce a substitution of public for 
private disability insurance coverage. In addition, the private retire-
ment system is built on the foundation of the much more comprehensive 
retirement system--social security. The level of benefits under private 
retirement plans are established, consciously or unconsciously, as a sup-
plement to anticipated OASDI benefits (Taggart, 1973). The expansion of 
social security taxes and benefits over several years would squeeze the 
private retirement system. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
In constructing the test discussed in this study, we refer to and 
build upon previous studies in the areas of income redistribution and pri-
vate philanthropy. In this chapter we briefly survey some of this work. 
Redistributive Effects of Public and 
Private Income Transfers 
Any analysis of the effects of transfers on the size rlistribution 
of income must begin with a choice from each of four constructs: the 
pretransfer and posttransfer income concepts, the income unit and the 
income accounting period.· As stated in Danziger, Haveman, and ~otnick 
(1981, p. 982), the agreement on the principles of the choice of these 
constructs is that 11 an ideal study should measure inequality in command 
over resources, among income-sharing units, over some specified time 
period, adjusting for 'needs' and life-cycle differences. 11 
Any measure of redistribution involves comparing a distribution of 
income before transfers with a distribution after. This implies that a 
basic conceptual and empirical problem in measuring redistributive effects 
concerns the definition of t~e counterfactual--what would the distribution 
of income be in the absence of existing transfers? The full set of 
general equilibrium changes in relative prices and incomes that would 
occur if transfers were removed should be recognized in defining the 
10 
counterfactual. Among them, the labor supply, savings, and changes in 
living arrangements, are the most obvious behavioral responses. 
11 
Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) have addressed the definition of the 
counterfactual, examined four different concepts of redistribution and 
concluded that the "true" pretransfer income can not be measured. 
Therefore, most studies measure redistribution as the simnle difference 
between final income (posttransfer income) and income excluding trans-
fers (pretransfer income). This comparison assumes that transfers eli-
cit no behavioral responses that would cause income without transfers to 
deviate from observed pretransfer income. However, there are potential 
labor supply, savings, and living arrangement effects induced by 
transfers. Hence, to the extent that the availability of transfers 
induces individuals to alter their behavioral responses, estimates of 
the redistributive effects of transfers will be biased. 
Size distributions of income for any time periqd are constructed by 
assigning incomes to income units and then arraying the units by size of 
income. Economists are well aware that such measures are imperfect. 
The income concept, the income unit, and the income accounting period 
used in constructing size distributions of income are far from ideal. 
Family units are the conventional base for many income statistics 
and represent the unit which shares decisions concerning living arrange-
ment and means of support. Distributions based on other income units, 
e.g., the individual income recipient, the household, or the spending 
unit, have also been constructed. The aggregate nature of the family 
unit has been criticized, and cited as a source of bias in the measure-
ment of inequality. Kuznets (1974) and Danziger and Plotnick (1977) 
have shown that the failure to account for changes in the demographic 
12 
composition of units, e.g., the increase in the number of single person 
units or units headed by the aged, has imparted an upward bias to the 
trend in measured inequality. Danziger and Taussig (1979) have 
addressed the problem of the treatment of the income unit as an aspect 
of the choice of weighting schemes in the construction of size distri-
butions of income. They argue that the conventional measurement, in 
which the weight given to each income is the same for all family units 
independent of their size, is not consistent with individualistic wel-
fare functions and has upwardly biased both the level and the trend in 
income inequality. 
The differences in income concept also affect the measures of 
income inequality. The income employed could be factor income, money 
income (factor income plus transfers), disposable money income (money 
income less federal income taxes) or net real income (disposable money 
income less cost of earning income, plus nonmoney income). The differ-
ences in them have substantial impact on the Gini coefficients (Benus 
and Morgan, 1975). The valuation of nonmoney income is a controversial 
subject. Another empirical problem is that many sources of income--
especially transfers received by the poor and property income received 
by the rich--are underreported. 
For many transfers--especially those that are age-related--a rnulti-
year or even lifetime accounting period is relevant for analyzing 
redistribution. The allocation of transfer benefits implies that we in 
fact compare an average individual in one income bracket with an averaqe 
individual in another income bracket. There are few average people and 
the position of individuals within each bracket is dispersed. If the 
transfers tend to accrue in line with certain characteristics such as 
13 
age and employment, the single year measurement is not meaningful any-
more and a longer period or lifetime pattern is called for (Musgrave, 
1980). For example, social security payments are age-related and would 
mainly represent a transfer of resources by each individual from an 
earlier to a later period. Hence, the payment should be treated in the 
same manner as private savings and their redistributive effect on life-
time income would actually be zero. 
Recently, several methods for both refining the income concept 
(Browning, 1976, 1979; Smeeding, 1977, 1979, 1982) and adjusting for 
changes in income unit (Danziger and Plotnick, 1977; Danziger and 
Taussig, 1979) have been suggested. Economists have also begun to 
address the problem of moving from a size distribution of annual income 
to one of multiyear or even lifetime income (Benus and Morgan, 1975; 
Mayer, 1974; Carlton and Hall, 1978; David and Menchik, 1979; Von 
Weizsacker; 1978). In general, we can summarize that (1) as the unit of 
analysis is broadened to include the earnings of all family members, the 
distribution of income becomes more equal, (2) the choice of income con-
cept substantially affects the results on income inequality, and (3) 
annual income inequality exceeds that of lifetime income by more than it 
exceeds inequality in multiyear income. According to Benus and Morgan 
(1975), except for some subgroups, the unit of analysis and the measures 
of income seem to have more effect on measures of inequality than the 
length of the accounting period. 
Public Income Transfers 
A large number of empirical studies have focused on the effect of 
public income transfers on the income distribution. Only a few of 
14 
these studies will be mentioned here. For a comprehensive review of 
studies on redistributive effect of public income transfers, the readers 
are referred to Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick (1981). 
Previous redistributive studies focus on three aspects of the 
effect of transfers; (1) the effect on income poverty, (2) the effect 
on the lowest quintiles income share, and (3) the effect on the Gini 
coefficients. The first one refers to the absolute impact of transfer 
on the incomes of the poorest units. The others refer to a relative 
dimension. 
Smeeding (1977) adjusts the census data for underreporting, and 
imputes values for federal personal income and payroll taxes, and for 
in-kind transfers (food, housing, and medical care). He finds that 
transfers significantly reduce poverty and that this redistributive 
effect has grown over time as the amount of transfers has increased. In 
1968, cash transfers reduced poverty from 23.1 percent to 12.3 percent, 
a reduction of 47 percent. By 1972, cash transfers reduced poverty from 
24.9 percent to 10.7 percent, a reduction of 57 percent. If in-kind 
transfers are added, the total percentage reduction of poverty are 53 
percent and 73 percent for 1968 and 1972, respectively. 
Gottschalk (1981), in his projections of poverty into the 1980's, 
also presents the evidence of the incidence of poverty before and after 
cash transfers for various years. The cash transfers reduced poverty 
from 31.3 percent to 21.7 percent, a reduction of 31 percent in 1963. 
In 1975, poverty has been decreased from 31.8 percent to 13.7 percent, a 
reduction of 57 percent. 
All of the studi~s·show a large impact of transfers on the share of 
the lowest quintile. Danziger and Plotnick (1977) find that the income 
15 
share of bottom quintile before transfer is 1.4 percent in 1965, and 0.9 
percent in 1974. After transfers, they are increased to 4.0 percent and 
3.8 percent, respectively. Browning (1979), valuing in-kind transfers 
at taxpayer costs, concludes that in-kind transfers increase the share 
of the bottom quintile by 1.59 percentage point (from 5.69 percent to 
7.28 percent); Smeeding (1979), valuing benefits at recipient values, 
finds a gain of 1.06 percentage points (from 5.69 percent to 6.75 
percent). 
As for the effect of transfers across the entire inco~e distribu-
tion, Benus and Morgan (1975) find that due to cash transfers the Gini 
coefficient is reduced by 15.1 percent. Danziger and Plotnick (1977) 
find a 11 percent and a 14.4 percent reduction in Gini coefficients due 
to cash transfers in 1965 and 1974, respectively. Reynolds and 
Smolensky (1977) estimate that cash and in-kind transfers both reduce the 
Gini coefficients by 6.4 percent in 1965; 9.5 percent in 1961; and 13.5 
percent in 1970. Smeeding (1977) suggests that cash transfers reduce 
the Gini coefficient by 17.4 percent in 1968 and 20 percent in 1972. 
In summary, all of the studies show that the redistributive effect 
of transfers has increased over time as the amount of transfers has 
increased. However, relative to the increase in transfers, the redis-
tributive impacts have increased only slightly. This is what Reynolds 
and Smolensky (1978) called "diminishing redistributive returns. 11 
Therefore, Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick (1981, p. 1019), in their 
conclusion, project that a proportional increase in current transfers is 
not likely to produce a sizable reduction in poverty and income inequal-
ity, for most of the "easy gains have been made" already. Unless a 
reform is proposed which would change the way current programs benefits 
16 
are targeted, an increase in the level of transfers would have a slight 
redistributive effect. Finally, the estimates of the magnitudes of 
redistributive effects are varied. The variance in the estimates could 
result from differences in the unit of analysis, the specific transfers 
included, thi assumptions for valuing in-kind transfers, corrections for 
underreporting, or the year of the analysis. 
Private Income Transfers 
In sharp contrast to the redistributive studies of public income 
transfers, there have been few studies on the redistributive effect of 
private transfers. Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick (1981) recognize 
this deficiency and argue that the existing studies do not adjust for 
the replacement of public by private transfers in the absence of the 
former. 
Morgan, David, Cohen, and Brazer (1962) note that private philan-
thropy adds its redistribution to that accomplished by public transfer 
programs. But they are less concerned with the different redistributive 
effects between public and private transfers; instead, they focus more 
on the motives of and attitudes toward private transfers. 
One possible advantage of privately-funded redistribution as 
opposed to the publicly-funded kind is that it can .be more flexible. 
Vickrey (1962) argues that private transfers offer the advantages of 
greater freedom and scope, less bureaucracy, and greater temporal and 
spatial immediacy than do government transfers. However, an examination 
of the aims of philanthropic activity reveals that not a great deal of 
it is directed toward redistributional purposes. That is, the activity 
is not intended to effect income transfers to people from the givers. 
17 
Vickrey {1962) cites a Bureau of Labor Statistics and Wharton School 
study (1950) that shows that of total givings, 32.6 percent were in the 
nature of family and reciprocity gifts having a small redistributional 
content, 21.4 percent were gifts for the support of individuals as ali-
mony representing some redistribution, and a further 29.4 percent were 
to religious organizations which are not of obviously redistributive 
nature. The Consumer Expendure Survey, 1972-73, reported by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics {1978), shows that 33.4 percent of private trans-
fers were to persons not in the family in the form of cash, 24.4 percent 
were to persons not in the family in the form of goods and services, and 
30.8 percent were to religious organizations. 
This seems to suggest that private charity cannot be relied upon to 
provide a significant level of transfers to the poor. The charity mar-
ket is not necessarily in conflict with the governmental redistributive 
network since the areas of operation have a limited overlap; the redis-
tributive content of private charity appears to be slight. 
Kennett {1980a, 1980b) discusses the area in which private activity 
can achieve more efficiently the redistributive objective. The relative 
advantages of private charitable organizations as against government 
agencies in achieving efficient redistribution of income and supply of 
services are examined. One reason for entrusting some redistributive 
responsibility to the private sector is that there are possible gains in 
efficiency which can be attributed to more conscientious costing behav-
ior and relatively lower wages demanded by workers who work for non-
profit organizations than workers who work for the government. Another 
reason is that some people gain satisfaction from giving, whereas few 
people actually gain satisfaction from paying their taxes. Moreover, 
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the "excess burden" is substantially decreased, because the avoidance 
costs of charitable giving are much lower. The extra dollar of tax rev-
enue procured by increasing existing tax rates or by instituting some new 
tax could encourage some taxpayers to adopt some alteration of their life-
style and activity, which would generate a misallocation of resources. 
On the other hand, there are some possible disadvantages of pri-
vately funded income transfers in comparison with publicly funded income 
transfers in achieving an efficient redistribution of income. The soli-
citation and administration costs for private philanthropy may be hiqh. 
The larger charitable organizations are remarkable for the low percent-
age of contributions that are actually applied to the agencies' field 
activities relative to the percentage used to maintain the organization 
and the percentage spent on fund raising. Grimes (1977) cites a study 
which concluded that fund raising costs can reach as high as 300 percent 
of contributions, and finds in his own research that administration and 
fund raising costs in the major medical charities vary from 19 to 48 
percent.I In contrast, the administration costs as a percent of total 
benefits paid in 1981 are 1.1 percent for OASI (Old Age and Survivors 
Insurance), 2.5 percent for DI (Disability Insurance), 1.3 percent for 
HI (Health Insurance), and 7.0 percent for SMI (Supplementary Medical 
Insurance).2 
lone of the original intents of the founding of United Funds was to 
benefit the donors because less money would be wasted on persuading a 
person to donate to one charity rather than another and to avoid the 
frantic competition between agencies for resources (Rose-Ackerman, 1980). 
Two national sample surveys of philanthropy found that excessive fund-
raising and administrative costs were most frequently mentioned of the 
things which the donors did not like about the way their contributions 
were used (Morgan, Dye, and Hybels, 1977). 
2These figures are cited from Social Security Bulletin, Annual 
Statistical Supplement, 1981, p. 2. 
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The comparative redistributive effects of public and private income 
transfers have been the subject of empirical study. Lampman (1972) has 
computed the percentage of public and private income transfers received 
by pretransfer poor households for 1967. Danziger, Haveman, and 
Plotnick (1980) have done this calculation for public income transfers 
for 1974. Table I shows that the percentage spent on the pretransfer 
poor through public programs is over 50 percent of the total expendi-
tures for all but veterans benefits. The percentage increase from 50 to 
59 for social insurance programs may indicate that its initial wage-
replacement function has been changed in the direction of income 
support. As for private income transfers, only direct interfamily gifts 
allocates half of its share to the pretransfer poor. Compared to social 
insurance, privately-insured benefits dispense a share only one-tenth as 
large to the pretransfer poor. This rough estimate seems to indicate 
that the income redistribution provided by the private sector is far 
less technically efficient than that provided by government. 
Lampman and Smeeding (982) criticize the traditional approach of 
comparing the current level of government transfers with the unrealistic 
counterfactual of a zero-transfer situation. Taking the fact that non-
government transfers existed before government transfers, they conclude 
that the conversion of private transfers to public transfers is unlikely 
to have much effect on the size distribution of income. However, this 
conclusion is based on two rather unrealistic assumptions: (1) that the 
total amount of transfers, either publicly-provided or privately-provided, 
is fixed; (2) that the government transfers will go to the same persons 
and in exact amounts that the private transfers did. Even if public 
transfers are perfect substitutes for private transfers, the way they 
distribute benefits among benefit recipients is not necessarily alike. 
TABLE I 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INCOME TRANSFERS RECEIVED BY 
PRETRANSFER POOR HOUSEHOLDS, 1967 AND 1974 
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Percentage Spent on 
Pretransfer Poor 
1967 1974 
Benefits of social welfare expenditures 
under public programs 40 NA 
a. Social insurance 50* 58.8 
b. Public aid 93* 85.9 
c. Veterans 46* 43 
d. Other welfare services 
and public housing 50 65** 
e. Health 50 58 
Privately insured benefits related 
to health and income maintenance 5* NA 
Direct interfamily gifts 50* NA 
Gifts via philanthropic institutions 23* NA 
NA means that the data are not available. 
*The numbers computed by Lampman (1972) based on Survey of Economic 
Opportunity data (table 7 in his study), when accounted for money 
income benefits only, are different. They are 53, 93, 46, 5, 33, 
and 33, respectively, in order of items arranged in this table. 
**In 1974 it is housing assistance which includes public housing, rent 
supplements, home ownership and rental housing assistance, sec. 236 
and other. 
Sources: Lampman (1972), table 1 for 1967 data. Danziger, Haveman, and 
Plotnick (1980), for 1974 data. 
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Until now, all redistributive studies reviewed, either on public or 
private income transfers, provide aggregate estimates of redistributive 
effects. They have not separated the effect of transfer progressivity--
how transfers are distributed among income classes--from the effect of 
the transfer rate--the size of transfers. Reynolds and Smolensky {1977) 
have attempted to disaggregate the redistributive effects for explaining 
11 the puzzl e11 ; namely, that the difference between the pre-fi sc and the 
post-fisc distribution is large each year but that the differences among 
post-fisc distributions in different years, are quite small. In order 
to isolate the effect of the distributor from the effect of the budget 
share, they let the budget share change, keeping the distributor and the 
pre-fisc distribution constant, and vice versa. By using this rather 
simple technique, they failed to further separate the effect of pre-fisc 
distribution from the effect of distribution of government taxes and 
expenditures. Analytically, a more systematic approach is dema,nded. 
Private Charitable Giving 
The subject of philanthropy is a broad academic area. The majority 
of the theoretical and empirical literature involves the relationship 
between charitable contributions and income taxes {for example, 
Feldstein, 1975a, 1975b; Feldstein and Clotfelter, 1976; Feldstein and 
Taylor, 1976; Schwartz, 1970; Taussig, 1967; Baskin and Feldstein, 1977; 
Clotfelter and Steuerle, 1981). Other studies examine t~e public goods 
character {Pareto optimal redistribution) of private charitable contri-
butions and are extremely relevant to this study. 
Economic theory is generally concerned with the exchange of 
economic goods. Philanthropic behavior, or the voluntary one-way 
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transfer of economic goods to individuals or organizations outside the 
family unit, has been rationalized in the economics literature by the 
hypothesis that individuals' preferences are defined over levels of con-
sumption of unrelated persons as well as level~ of their own consump-
ti on. Boulding (1962) and Vickrey (1962) were among the first morlern 
economists to suggest this rationalization of charitable giving. 
Friedman (1962) argues that private charity is one of the means to 
alleviate poverty, but--
••• it can be argued that private charity is insufficient 
because the benefits from it accrue to people other than those 
who make the gifts •••• We might all of us be willing to 
contribute to the relief of poverty, provided everyone else 
did. We might not be willing to contribute the same amount 
without such assurance (pp. 190-191). 
This indicates that if matters are left to uncoordinated private 
philanthropy, a free-rider problem will arise. 
Buchanan (1968) makes a distinction between redistribution and 
allocation motives for transfer. He argues that the traditional 
allocation-distribution dichotomy, deriving criteria for optimality in 
allocation from individual evaluations and calling upon external, non-
individualistic weights for deriving distributive norms, is methodo-
logically inconsistent. The individual evaluations should be allowed to 
enter into the norms in distribution. 
This line of argument has been used, in a series of papers com-
mencing with Hochman and Rodgers (1969), to justify fiscal intervention 
of income redistribution on the grounds of Pareto efficiency. Hochman 
and Rodgers (1969, 1974) postulate interdependent utility as a rational 
explanation for income redistribution hy government. Studies by Thurow 
(1971) and Zeckhauser (1971) based on utility interdependence assume 
that those who are well off use the state as a mechanism for making 
gifts to the poor. These studies suggest that greater equality of 
income may be in the nature of a public goods. 
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Von Furstenberg and Mueller (1971) criticize the two-person case 
outlined by Hochman and Rodgers and contend that by recognizing the pos-
sible public goods nature of voluntary transfers, the justification and 
feasibility of government-enforced Pareto optimal redistribution must be 
discussed beyond the two-person care. After the simulation of a derived 
Pareto optimal redistributive tax scheme, however, they emphasize the 
conceptual and practical obstacles of implementing the Pareto approach to 
redistribution. 
Polinky (1971) points out that Hochman and R~dgers employ a defi-
cient concept of the utility possibility frontier. But, after the 11 true 11 
welfare frontier is obtained, the redistribution of income through 
public institutions can be justified on efficiency grounds even more 
strongly than was argued by Hochman and Rodgers. 
Contrary to the Von Furstenberg-Mueller assertion, Brennan (1973) 
argues that the assumption of universal altruism is not required for 
Pareto optimal redistribution. Malice and envy may establish a case for 
redistribution within the Pareto framework. Redistribution from rich to 
poor retains its public goods property. It is simply that the nature of 
benefits conferred varies according to motivation--individuals motivated 
by malice and envy may also contribute, not because they value increased 
consumption by the poor, but because they value reduced consumption by 
the rich. 
Among the studies attempting to provide empirical evidence on the 
determinants of the level of private charitable giving whose main 
interest is in the relationship between private charitable giving and 
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income taxes, some have also tested the interdependence hypothesis. 
Schwartz (1970) attempted this by including in his equation per capita 
non-donor income as a proxy for the consumption of the relevant recipi-
ent group. This variable had a highly significant negative coefficient, 
supporting the interdependent utility hypothesis. 
Hochman and Rodgers (1973) also tested a variant of the inter-
dependence hypothesis by including in the equation a variable measuring 
the dispersion of income within the metropolitan area. This variable 
had a highly significant coefficient with the predicted positive sign. 
Abrams ~nd Schmitz (1978) present evidence that there is a negative 
relationship between social welfare expenditures and private charitable 
giving. Amos (1981) also shows that increased government aid to poten-
tial recipients would reduce private charitable giving. All these 
results indicate that the utility interdependence hypothesis is statis-
tically acceptable. However, even if the utility interdepend~nce 
receives much supports empirically, it does not necessarily imply that 
private charitable giving will be inefficiently supplied. Hochman and 
Rodgers (1973) tested the public goods character by including in the 
equation the number of persons in the metropolitan area. Although they 
had a coefficient with expected negative sign, this coefficient is not 
statistically significant. Therefore, the question of whether the 
private charitable giving is efficiently provided remains undecided. In 
summary, it should be noted that the utility interdependence hypothesis 
is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition of public goods theory 
of optimal private charitable giving. 
Becker (1974) provides a formal model of this kind of argument and 
uses it to derive some empirical implications of the utility 
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interdependence hypothesis. Becker's model is based on the maximiza-
tion, subject to the individual's budget constraint, of a utility func-
tion representing the.individual's preferences over the levels of his 
own consumption and the consumption of others about whom the individual 
is concerned. It is assumed that there are N philanthropic persons in 
the society. For each of them, the utility function is: 
ui = ui (xi, z) i = 1, ••• , N (2 .1) 
where Xi denotes the consumption of individual i and Z is the extent of 
charitable activity as a whole. The first partial rlerivatives of each 
individual's utility with respect to both own income and recipients' 
incomes are all positive; the second partials are all negativ~. 
Each individual faces the budget constraint: 
xi + Pi Wi - Yi = 0 i = 1, ••• , N (2.2) 
where Pi denotes the price of the charitable contributions which equals 
1 minus the marginal tax rate of individual i, wi is the charitable 
giving of individual i, and Yi is the given income which can be spent on 
individual i or on charitable contributions. The price of contributions 
is less than unity because many charitable contributions are deductible 
when computing personal income tax liability. According to Becker's 
theory of social interactions, each individual has a set of production 
functions that determine how much of the commodities (or basic wants) 
can be produced with the market goods, time, and other resources avail-
able to him. In his explanation, the "environmental" variables, which 
will affect the individual's decision making, include the characteris-
tics of other persons. Under the assumption that the effect of other 
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variables on this characteristic is independent of the individual i's 
effort, Z can be illustrated as follows: 
N 
Z = l wi+g 
i=l 
(2.3) 
where g is other sources of charity income from government. If the 
total income of the charity from all sources other than i's giving is 
denoted by Ci, the budget constraint can be now rewritten as: 
Xi+ PiZ - (piCi + Yi) = 0 i = 1, ... ,N 
where Xi + PiZ (or Pi Ci +Yi) represents the 11 social income 11 of 
individual i. 
To maximize the utility function given by (2.1) subject to the 
constraint on social income, given by (2.4) taking Ci as given, the 
equilibrium condition is 
If we denote ui 
l 
(aui/axi)/(aui;az) = 1/Pi 
i . 
= au I axi, Uz 
i p.U. 
l l 
= aui/aZ, (2.5) becomes 




For each individual, Figure 1 presents this optimality condition graphi-
cally. The function mb (marginal benefit) gives the value of the right-
hand term of (2.6). It is monotonically decreasing, because the 
individual's marginal utility of transfers to recipients is monotonically 
decreasing. The schedule me (marginal cost) shows the value of the left-
hand term of (2.6). It is monotonically increasing because the 
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individual has decreasing marginal utility of own-income and, therefore, 
his marginal utility of own-income rises with wi.3 The level of trans-
fers which maximizes the individual's utility, given his tastes, initial 
income, and price of contribution, is given by the intersection of two 
curves at wi*· In other words, this model implies the individual's 
optimal level of contributions varies directly with his income, and 
inversely with price of contributions and the level of consumption of 




= Pi Ui 
i 
mb = Uz 
Figure 1. Equilibrium Condition of Private 
Charitable Giving 
To prove that this equilibrium is not Pareto optimal, Warr (1982) 
employs a three-person case, where individual 1 and 2 are transferors; 
individual 3 is the recipient. Given the price is equal to unity, if 
3For ease of exposition, schedules mb and me are both drawn as 
straight lines. 
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individual 1 and 2 each agrees to increase his contributions to individ-
ual 3 by one unit, the effect of this on individual i's welfare, where 
i=l,2, is given by 
This, from (2.6), is necessarily positive. Thus, both transferors bene-
fit from this additional contributions and so, obviously, does the 
recipient. In other words, the condition of (2.6) is not one of Pareto 
optimality. Furthermore, Warr i 11 ustrates that as 1 ong as private 
transfers are at a positive level, the substitution between government 
transfers and private transfers will be unity. Thus, incremental fiscal 
redistribution cannot achieve a Paretian welfare improvement. This, 
however, will not be the case, if the fiscal measures will affect pri-
vate transferors' marginal incentives to donate. 
For opposition, Reece (1979) adopts a Tobit estimating procedure to 
analyze charitable contributions. By including average public assist-
ance per recipient and lower quintile family income for the metropolitan 
area, he concludes that the utility interdependence hypothesis receives 
little support from his results. 
McKenzie (1981) criticizes economists for their frequent failure to 
recognize some critical but hidden assumptions relating to the construc-
tion of the demand for a public goods. Therefore, they have incorrectly 
concluded, especially in discussions of income redistribution, that 
independent, non-collective purchases of a public goods by individuals 
in large group setting will necessarily lead to under-consumption and 
production ·of the public goods. Two hidden assumptions embedded in 
standard analysis of income redistribution are: (1) it is assumed that 
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everyone is aware of, and benefits from, the poverty relief provided by 
anyone to the recipients and (2) it is assumed that the individual 
demand curves for income redistribution lie totally above the horizontal 
axis. The second is similar to what Brennan (1973) calls the disutility 
of transfers. A central conclusion drawn from this analysis is that 
corrections for these assumptions indicate a move from private to public 
charity that may very well lead to a reduction in the amount of aid 
received by the poor and may, therefore, be Pareto inefficient. 
Pasour (1981) argues that there appear to be no beneficial consump-
tion externalities associated.with most real world transfers. As 
McKenzie, he also contends that, (1) even if there are positive exter-
nalities associated with transfers, government redistribution cannot 
achieve Pareto optimality so long as there are one or more persons who 
are opposed to redistribution policies and (2) it is not costless to 
inform additional people about the transfer. Finally, due to the exis-
tence of deficiencies in redistributing income for both public and pri-
vate transfers, he suggests making a direct private and public transfers 
comparison in income redistribution. 
Sugden (1982) points out that the public goods theory of optimal 
private charitable giving relies on three principal assumptions; first, 
publicness (the charitable activity is a common argument in many indi-
viduals' utility functions); second, utility maximization (each indi-
vidual 1 s decisions concerning his charitable activity are determined 
solely by the objective of maximising his utility); third, the existence 
of Nash conjectures (each individual, when deciding how much to con-
tribute, takes everyone else's contributions as given). He argues that 
public goods theory is inconsistent with certain well-established 
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observations and is therefore untenable. Among others he derives math-
ematically a condition for Nash conjectures; if Nash conjectures are 
true, then the gifts of different donors and/or government welfare 
spending and private giving will be close substitutes. 
In summary, in regard to the income redistribution supplied by the 
private sector, economists' arguments center on two subjects; (1) 
whether it is of a public goods character (and inefficiently supplied) 
and (2) whether the public or the private sector can achieve Pareto 
optimality, if redistribution is a public good. The second subject is 
concerned with the problem of disutility of transfers felt by some 
persons; in other words, the non-uniform tastes problem. However, 
Brennan (1973) ingeniously resolves this problem and concludes that the 
problem of non-uniform tastes may well be less intractable with regard 
to income redistribution than with other public goods. Thus, this study 
is interested in the first subject, despite the still growing disputes 
on the second one. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
Much of the research for the present study is concerned with the 
development and quantification of (1) a measure which decomposes redis-
tributive effects and (2) of a measure which captures the public goods 
character of private welfare transfers. Data for 28-metropolitan areas 
will be employed for hypothesis testing. Ordinary least squares tech-
niques are employed in the study to estimate the parameters of the 
regression equations. The theoretical arguments on which the methodo-
logy of this study is based will be addressed in the following chapter. 
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section deals with 
redistributive effects of income transfers. The second section provides 
the logic of the examination of the public goods character of private 
welfare income transfers. 
The elements of the methodology used in this study can be best 
envisioned by a graphic presentation of the detailed steps and logic 
employed, as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. 
Redistributive Effects of Income Transfers 
As Figure 2 shows, the process begins by asking the question of what 
causes the differences in family income distribution among geographic 
entities. Next, several major variables which are expected to explain 
these differences are selected. These can be classified into two 
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What causes the differences 
in family income distribution 
among geographic entities? 
Hypothesized factors which are 
expected to explain the 
differences in Gini ratios 
(after transfers) 
Other relevant factors 
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Figure 2. Logic of Decomposition of Redistributive Effects 
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groups; various income transfers and other relevant factors. The latter 
is represented by a summary index--the Gini coefficient before trans-
fers. According to the decomposition rule developed, in Chapter IV total 
income transfers, either public or private, are disaggregated into the 
average transfer rate and the degree of transfer progressivity. Because 
part of the redistributive effects of transfers depends on the multi-
plicative relationships between transfer rates and progressivities, two 
interaction variables are developed specifically to capture this impact. 
Finally, the Gini coefficients representing a comprehensive measure of 
income distribution are regressed on all these variables. Then, the 
marginal redistributive effects of public and private transfers, depend-
ing either on the average transfer rates or on the degrees of transfer 
progressivity, can be estimated and compared. In addition, by simple 
calculations, the total redistributive effects for each geographic 
entity can be obtained. 
Public Goods Character of Private Welfare 
Income Transfers 
The conceptual processes used in examining the public goods charac-
ter of private welfare transfers are shown in Figure 3. This process 
begins with the question of what causes behavioral differences with 
respect to private contributions. The theoretical model rests on: 
(1) the assumption of utility interdependence (which means that higher 
income people benefit from increases on incomes of lower income people), 
(2) Nash conjectures (which mean that each individual, when deciding how 
much to contribute to a charitable activity, takes everyone else 1 s 
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Figure 3. Logic of Testing for the Public Goods Characte~ 
of Private Welare Transfers 
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hypothesized explanatory variables are obtained. They include incoP1e, 
the "price" of contributions, income distribution (before transfers), 
the level and distribution of public income transfers, and the size of 
the donor population. The three assumptions provide the pasis for a 
public goods theory of private contributions. If any one of the assump-
tions is violated, the allocative inefficiency of private contributions 
is not necessarily proven. 
This study will concentrate on the hypotheses of utility interde-
pendence and Nash conjectures. To investigate the uti 1 i ty i nterdepen-
dence hypothesis, both the relationships of the income distribution 
(before transfers) and the level and distribution of public income 
transfers with respect to the level and distribution of private welfare 
income transfers, respectively, are considered. The utility interdepen-
dence assumption will be relaxed only when testing with respect to hoth 
the level and distribution of private welfare income transfers rejects 
the hypothesis simultaneously. In other words, even if utility inter-
dependence does not appear in the testing with respect to the level of 
private welfare income transfers, it may still be discovered in the 
testing for the distribution of private welfare income transfers. 
After this examination, if utility interdependence is violated, it 
can be concluded that the private welfare income transfers are not 
public goods. However, if the hypothesis is accepted, then whether the 
public goods theory is tenable must further depend on the investigation 
of Nash conjectures. 
For the examination of Nash conjectures, two variables--size of 
donor population and level of public income transfers--are employed with 
respect to the level of private welfare income transfers. If the 
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donor's conjectural variation--the individual's conjecture about related 
other's behavior--in the s~all-numbers case is certain, the simple 
relationship between donor population and level of private welfare 
income transfers is an appropriate measure for testing the public goods 
character. If, on the contrary, the donor's conjectural variation is 
uncertain (skill and strategy are involved), then in addition, the rela-
tionship between the level of public income transfers and the level of 
private welfare income transfers needs to be introduced to supplement 
the testing. Therefore, in this study the level of public income trans-
fers plays a role both in the examination of the utility interdependence 
hypothesis, and in the verification of Nash conjectures. Whether there 
is a substitution relationship between public income transfers and pri-
vate welfare income transfers is used as one of the ways of examining 
the public goods character of private welfare income transfers. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter contains two sections. The first discusses the decom-
position of total redistributive effects of transfers into the separate 
effects of transfer progressivity and the overall level of the trans-
fers. The second section develops a modified and extended traditional 
theoretical model for explaining the public goods character of private 
welfare income transfers. 
The Decomposition of Redistributive Effects 
There are many differences among the techniques used in redistrib-
utive studies. By adjusting or employing different income concepts, 
income units or accounting periods, the magnitudes of the income dis-
tribution effect can be varied. Until now, few studies intending 
explicitly to decompose the redistributive effects of income transfers, 
both public and private, have been done. But, as is well-known, the 
income distribution can be affected by taxes through two different chan-
nels; the progressivity of the tax and the overall level of the tax 
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 1980; Jacobson, 1976). Although the tax can be 
defined in a broad sense including its negative counterpart, a transfer, 
here the disaggregation of the redistributive effect of transfers is 
stressed. Other than transfers, there are many other factors which play 
a decisive role in determining the distribution of income. Therefore, 
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the complete picture is that the total effect on distribution depends 
not only on how progressive transfers are and on the overall level of 
transfers, but also on the underlying (before-transfer) distribution of 
income. By applying the theorems and corollaries derived by Kakwani 
(1977), which are presented in the Appendix, the relationship above can 
be illustrated. 
Lorenz and Concentration Curves 
Let y be a given income level, F(y) be the distribution which rep-
resents the proportion of income units having income less than or.equal 
toy, and F1(y) be the distribution which represents the proportion of 
total income earned by income units having income less than or equal to 
y. Then, the Lorenz curve can be defined in terms of the relationship 
between F(y) and F1(y). The most widely used Gini index is simply equal 
to one minus twice.the area under the Lorenz curve (Miller, 1966). The 
smaller the area under the Lorenz curve, the greater is the income 
inequality. In other words, the less the Gini, the greater is the 
income equality. 
Assuming that g(y) is a continuous function of y, F1[g(y)] is the 
distribution function which represents the proportion of total q(y) 
owned by income units having income less than or equal toy. The 
relationship between F1[g(y)] and F(y) will be called the concentration 
curve of the function g(y). It can be seen that the Lorenz curve of y 
is a special case of the concentration curve for the function g(y) when 
g(y) = y. Similarly, the concentration index for g(y) is defined as one 
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minus twice the area under the concentration curve for g(y).1 
For example, transfer income (T) is a function of total income, 
i.e., T = g(y). Therefore, to derive the concentration curve of trans-
fer income, the income units need to be ranked according to the total 
income (y). But to obtain the Lorenz curve of transfer income requires 
the ranking of income units according to transfer income, not total 
income. 
Effects of Transfers on Income Distribution 
Kakwani ingeniously extends and generalizes the concept of the 
Lorenz curve to study the relationships among the distributions of dif-
ferent economic variables. He also gives the theorems and corollaries 
relating the concentration curve of the function g(y) and its elastic-
ity, which provide the basis for analyzing the relationships among the 
distribution of different economic variables. In this study, we will 
apply the theorems discussed by Kakwani to the case of income transfers, 
although we shall change his notation and make one refinement, takin9 
the underlying income distribution into account in the application. 
Let y be the before-transfer income (public and/or private trans-
fers) of an individual and T(y) the transfer function. Then, the dis-
posable income is given by: 
Yd(y) = Y + T(y). 
lrt should be pointed out that the concentration curve for g(y) is 
not the same thing as the Lorenz curve for g(y). The condition for them 
to be identical is that g(y) is a non-decreasing function of y, i.e., 
the function is convex. For proof, see Kakwani (1977) and Cowell 
(1977). 
By using Theorem 2, we have2 
E[yd(y)] F1[Yd(y)] = {E(y) + E[T(y)]} F1[Yd(y)] 
= E(y) F1(y) + E[T(y)] F1[T(y)]. 
where Eis the expected value operator. After simplifying the result, 
we obtain 
where A is the average transfer rate of the society, defined as 
E[T(y)]/E(y). 
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If the transfer elasticity is less than unity for ally, which 
indicates that the transfer is regressive, then Corollary 2 implies that 
F1[T(y)] > F1(Y) for all Y, i.e., F1[T(y)] - F1(y) > o.3 Since A is a 
positive proportion, i.e., 0, A, 1, A/(l+A) will rise as A increases. 
From (4.1), we can conclude that when the transfer elasticity is given, 
as long as it is less than unity, the after-transfer income distribution 
(concentration curve of Yd) will be more equal than the before-transfer 
distribution (concentration curve of y) when the average transfer rate 
is increasing. The results would be reversed if the transfer elasticity 
is progressive, i.e., its value is greater than unity. 
From Theorem 1, we know that the distance between F1(Y) and F1[T(y)J 
2rn this section, whenever the theorems and corollaries are cited, 
they are all from Kakwani (1977). The numbers used here refer to the 
same numbers used in that study. 
3Both taxes and transfers are progressive when the ratio of taxes 
paid or transfers received to income rises as income rises, i.e., tax or 
transfer elasticity is greater than 1. Thus, progressive taxes favor 
lower income groups, while progressive transfers favor higher income 
groups; i.e., both progressive taxes and regressive transfers are 
pro-poor. 
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depends on the transfer elasticity. It follows that if the transfer 
elasticity is less {greater) than unity, the less the transfer elasti-
city, with the A value given and the concentration curve of T{y) above 
{below) the concentration curve of y, the greater {less) is the distance 
between F1{y) and F1[T{y)], i.e., the greater the value of F1[T{y)] 
- F1{y). Accordingly, the income after transfers will be more equally 
distributed than the income before transfers. 
Therefore, both the average transfer rate and the transfer elas-
ticity {progressivity) are determinants of the magnitude of the trans-
fer's redistributive effect. In addition, it is noted that the rela-
tionship between the average transfer rate, through A/l+A, and the 
transfer progressivity, through F1[T{y)] - F1{y), is multiplicative. 
This indicates that the effect of the average transfer rate {transfer 
progressivity) on income distribution depends on the level of transfer 
progressivity {average transfer rate). In other words, it is deduced 
that the average transfer rate {transfer progressivity) does not have 
the same redistributive effect regardless of the value of transfer 
progressivity {average transfer rate). 
The relationship among the concentration curves in {4.1) can be 
best envisioned as in Figure 4. The before- and after-transfer income 
distributions and transfer distribution, F1{y), F1[Yd{y)] and F1[T{y)] 
versus F{y), respectively, are illustrated. The distances between 
F1{y) and F1[Yd{y)J and between F1{y) and F1[T(y)] are shown as cres-
cent areas OABC and OABD, respectively. If the transfer is regressive, 
i.e., F1[T{y)] > F1{y), the concentration curve of T{y) and, accord-
ingly, the concentration curve of Yd, will be above the concentration 
curve of y. Then, the larger the area of OABD, i.e., the higher the 
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degree of transfer regressivity, the larger is the area of OABC, given 
the average transfer rate. Thus, the after-transfer distribution is 
more equal than before-transfer distribution. It is noted that the 
concentration curve of T(y) and, accordingly, the concentration curve of 
Yd, will be below the concentration curve of y, if the transfer is 
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Figure 4. Relationships Between Transfer Distribution and 
Before- and After-Transfer Income Distributions 
Effect of Underlying Income Distribution 
Until now, the underlying (before-transfer) income distribution is 
held constant. A further task is required if there exists a variation 
in the underlying income distribution. 
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Let Fi(y) and Fi(y) represent two before-transfer income 
distributions and T1(Y) and T2(Y) be two transfer functions. Then, from 
(4.1), it follows 
1 1 1 Fl[yd(y)] - Fl(y) = [Aif(l+Al)] {Fl[Tl(y)] - Fl(y)} (4.la) 
Fl[y~(y)] - Fi(y) = [A2/(l+A2)J {Fl[T2(y)] - Fi(y)} (4.lb) 
Subtracting (4.lb) from (4.la), we obtain 
1 2 Fl[yd(y)] - Fl[yd(y)] = [Aif(l+Al)] Fl[Tl(y)] + 
1 {1 - [A1/(l+A1)]} F1(y) - [A2/(l+A2)J F1[T2(y)] -
2 {1 - [A2/(l+A2)]} F1(y). 
It is noted that other than average transfer rates and transfer elastic-
ities (progressivities), the underlying distributions have impacts on 
the after-transfer distributions. Additionally, the characteristic of 
1 multiplicity is also found, i.e., {1 -[A1/(l+A1)]}F1(y) and {1 -
2 [A2/(l+A2)J}F1(y). 
In order to specify the effect of the underlying distributions, it 
is assumed that the average transfer rate and transfer elasticity 
(progressivity) are constants and the same in both cases, i.e., A1 = A2 
and F1[T1(y)] = F1[T2(y)]. Thus, we can obtain 
( 1) 1 2 1 2 If F1(y) = F1(y), then F1[yd(y)] = F1[yd(y)]. This indicates 
that two after-transfer income di stri buti ons wi 11 be of no 
difference because their before-transfer income distributions 
are the same. 
(2) If Fi(y) * Fi(y), after simplifying the result, we have 
Because 1 
1 Fl [yd(y)] 
1 2 1 2 Fl[yd(y)] - Fl[yd(y)] = {1 - [Al/(l+Al)]} [Fl(y) Fl(y)]. 
- [A1/(l+A1)J is always greater than zero, the sign of 
2 1 2 - F1[yd(y)] will be determined by F1(y) - F1(y) alone. 
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Therefore, 1 2 1 2 if F1(y) > F1(y), F1[yd(y)] > F1[yd(y)] and vice versa. This 
indicates that a more (less) equal before-transfer distribution will 
automatically have a more (less) equal after-transfer distribution, 
given the same average transfer rates and transfer elasticities. 
In summary, the above analysis gives rise to the conclusion that 
the total effect on the income distribution depends on the public and 
private transfer rates and progressivities, and on the underlying income 
distribution. So far as the empirical study of redistribution is con-
cerned, the decomposition of transfers into average rates and progres-
sivities, which are multiplicative with respect to income distribution, 
and the isolation of the effect of the underlying income distribution 
are very critical. 
The Economic Analysis of Private 
Welfare Income Transfers 
The aforementioned redistributive effect of transfers concerns 
technical efficiency with respect to income redistribution, or the con-
tributions to income (in)equality through the distribution and the size 
of transfers, either publicly or privately provided. Whether or not the 
amount of private welfare transfers is efficiently determined was not 
addressed. 
Private welfare transfers are a part of private charitable contri-
butions, although not all private charitable contributions result in 
income transfers. In this section the implications of the public 
goods theory of private charitable contributions are extended and 
modified. Although the three assumptions of interdependent utility, 
Nash conjectures, and utility maximization are applied here, we will 
examine the first two more deeply. 
Nash Conjectures 
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It seems reasonable to assume Nash conjectures in the large-numbers 
case. The preference-revelation problem, the consumption benefit exter-
nality, and the absence of exclusion all encourage individuals to act as 
free-riders. People will believe that their individual contributions 
will not affect the total supply of income transfers significantly. 
This implies that independent, non-collective provision of income trans-
fers by individuals in the large group setting will necessarily lead to 
under-consumption and production of income transfers. 
On the face of it, public goods theory might seem more applicable 
to transfers with many donors than to transfers with few. The reason is 
that in the case of transfers with only a few donors, donors would soon 
become aware of each other 1 s existence and then strategic considerations 
would come into play. Only a naive person would hold Nash conjectures 
in such circumstances. But, while strategic bargaining between indi-
viduals would lead to an efficient solution, which implies no free-rider 
problem, there is little reason to assume that individuals will defi-
nitely behave in this fashion. In other words, in the small-numbers 
case, the bargaining model of public expenditures (Buchanan, 1968; 
Musgrave and Musgrave, 1980; Shibata, 1971; Bresnahan, 1981) so 
thoroughly developed already could be applied. This model demonstrates 
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that bilateral monopoly theory is applicable to the pure theory of 
public expenditures in the small-numbers case. 
Imagine an economy with two rich individuals, rlenoted 1 and 2, and 
one poor, denoted 3, in which the consumption of the poor individual 
enters the utility functions of the rich. To keep the discussion 
simple, it is supposed that the two rich individuals are each uncon-
cerned about the consumption of the other. The rich have the utility 
functions un = un(xn, x3), n = 1, 2, where Xi, i = 1, 2, 3, denotes the 
consumption of individual i. Individual 3 has the utility function 
u3 = u3(x3). The functions ui, i = 1, 2, 3, are each concave, twice 
differentiable, and strictly increasing in all arguments (thus, there is 
no 11 envy 11 or malice"), i.e., aun/ax3 > o, aui;ax. > o, a2ui;ax? < o. l l 
Each individual receives a lump-sum income, denoted Yi, which is deter-
mined outside the present model. It is considered given for each indi-
vidual here. Let w1 and w2 be the contributions to individual 3 from 
individuals 1 and 2, respectively. For brevity, the price of contrihu-
tions is assumed unity for every individual. 
Case 1: If Nash Conjectures Hold. Under the traditional assump-
tions, individuals 1 and 2 maximize their own utilty, taking other's 
donations as given, subject to the constraints as follows: 
For the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to be fulfilled, this implies that 
wi(U~ - u1) = o and u~ - u1 ~ o, where i = 1, 2, and u~ = aui;axi. 
(4.2) 
If wi > 0, then U~ = u1, which indicates that the individuals will 
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set their levels of contributions where the marginal utilities attaching 
to their own and the recipient's consumption are equated. This is the 
same as the result derived by Becker (1974). Therefore, as compared to 
the Pareto conditions for the optimal consumption of a public goods, it 
demonstrates that the free-rider problem arises in this occasion; i.e., 
an efficient amount of transfers is not obtained. 
But, because there are only two donors involved, the free-rider 
problem may disappear. Individuals will find it worthwhile to hargain, 
since individual contributions now significantly affect their own posi-
tion and that of others. The characteristic of conjectural variation is 
that individuals conjecture about related others• (individuals or 
government) behavior. This implies that in the small-numbers situation, 
the conjectural variation of decision makers with respect to either 
other individuals or government should not be treated as constant. The 
conjectural variation between individuals is discussed first, followed 
by that between individuals and government. 
Case 2: Relaxation of Nash Conjectures--The Conjectural Variation 
Between Individuals Is Not Constant. Here it is assumed that w2 = 
v(w1), which indicates the conjecture of individual 1 about the behavior 
of individual 2 in response to the action of individual 1. By maxi-
mizing his (individual 1) utility, subject to the constraints (4.2) and 
w2 = v(w1), he will determine an optimal level of contributions. This 
1 1 1 1 1 implies the Kuhn-Tucker condition w1(u 1 - u3 - v•u 3) = O and u1 - u3 -
v•u~ ~ o, where v1 = aw2/aw1• 
If w1 > O, then u~ - u~ - v1 U~ = O which can be shown as uf = 
(1 + v1 )U~. This indicates that the level of contributions of 
individual 1 depends upon the value of v1 , or the conjectural variation 
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of individual 1 with respect to individual 2. As shown in Figure 5 
(refer to Figure 1), if v1 > 0, the mb curve will shift upward tomb~ 
and the equilibrium level of contributions is wl, this is an increase in 
contributions as compared to the equilibrium with the assumption of Nash 
. t * conJec ures, w • If v1 < 0, then the mb curve will shift downward to 
II 2 mb, and the equilibrium level of contributions will decrease tow. 
Individual 1 will contribute nothing if he conjectures that the reaction 
from individual 2 totally offsets the contribution he would make, i.e., 
v• = -1. 
mb 
me 
w2 w* wl w 
Figure 5. Equilibrium Conditions of Private Giving--
Relaxation of Nash Conjectures 
Case 3: Relaxation of Nash Conjectures--The Conjectural Variation 
Between Individuals and Government Is Not Constant. Up to this sta<1e, 
the government has played no role in the analysis. In this case, it 
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will be taken into account. For the function w2 = v(w1), it is assumed, 
instead, that g = m(wi), where g is government transfers spent on 
individual 3 and i = 1, 2. This function incorporates the conjectures 
of individuals about the behavior of government in response to action 
taken by the individuals. The government transfers should be added to 
the consumption function of individual 3; i.e., x3 = Y3 + w1 + w2 + g. 
Similarly, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be derived as wi(U~ - u1 
= 0 and 
m•ui -- 3 -
Ui ui •ui i - 3 - m 3 
i o, or ui = (1 
) 0, where m' = ag/awi. If wi > 0, then 
+ m1 )U1. This implies that the level of 
contributions of individuals depends upon the value of m', or the con-
jectural variation of individual i with respect to the government. When 
m' is substituted for v', the implications derived above can be applied 
to this case. The individual's contributions, taking the conjectural 
variation of individuals with respect to the government into account, 
would not necessarily be the same as the contributions determined with 
the assumption of Nash conjectures. 
Case 4: An Extreme--Ultrarationality. The assumption of ultra-
rationality means that each individual perceives other individuals or the 
government as agents or intermediaries in the transfer of income. For 
brevity, only the relationship between individuals and government is dis-
cussed here. There are two interesting situations which deserve atten-
tion. Firsti if the taxes imposed upon individuals are earmarked to 
transfer income to individual 3, then (4.2) will become: 
x1 = Yl - w1 - 91 
x3 = Y3 + w1 + w2 + 91 + 92 
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where 91, 92 are the taxes paid by individual 1 and 2, respectively. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions under Nash conjectures are wi{U~ - u1} = O and 
U~ - Uj) 0, i = 1, 2, which are identical to those of Case 1. This 
implies that if Wi > 0, taxing donors in this way simply induces each to 
contract his voluntary donations by exactly the amount of the tax, so as 
i i to re-establish his marginal equilibrium condition, Ui = u3• As a result, 
the sum of his private contributions and the amount government gives "in 
his name" remains the same. 
Secondly, even if the conjectural variation function is introduced 
into this occasion, the equilibrium condition does not change at all; 
namely, {l+m'}U~ = {l+m'}U1, which is equivalent to U~ = u1, if m' * -1. 
This implies that if the individuals perceive the government as an agent 
which transfers income from them to recipients, taking the conjectural 
variation into account as a variable does not change the level of 
contributions which would have been made under the assumption of Nash 
co~jectures. But there is one exception; if m' = -1, the action of 
individuals is totally offset by government, and there will be no indi-
vidual contributions at all. In this case, individuals perceive that 
the government will contribute all that they would have contributed in 
the absence of government transfers. These two sub-cases are examples 
of ultrarationality of individual behavior and can be generalized to the 
large numbers case. 
In summary, only in the case of ultrarationality is the assumption 
of Nash conjectures logically acceptable, for the result is no different 
from the case of removing Nash conjectures, except that m' = -1. This 
confirms the result obtained by Sugden (1982). Furthermore, whether or 
not the efficient solution can be obtained in the small numbers case 
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depends on the values of conjectural variations representing bargaining 
strategies and skills between individuals or between individuals and 
government; i.e., on v1 and m1 • In the small nuMbers case, being a free 
rider is not easy to do. Therefore, the problem of concern in this 
occasion is the strategic behaviors between individuals and/or between 
individuals and government, rather than the existence of free riders. 
Interdependent Utility--An Extension 
The assumption that individual 1 s utility function depends on both 
own-consumption and other individuals 1 consumptions is one of the neces-
sary conditions for income redistribution to have the character of a 
public goods. Therefore, empirical evidence on the existence of inter-
dependent utility has been discussed often in previous studies. (For 
example, Hochman and Rodgers, 1973; Reece, 1979; Sugden, 1982.) The 
approach normally used in these studies is to regress...the level of 
private charitable giving on the variahles, which represent the absolute 
or relative consumptions of the potential recipients; for example, the 
income dispersion before transfers, the level of government transfers, 
and the distribution of government transfers. The weakness of this 
approach is that it only considers the interdependent relationship 
between individuals in terms of the size of private charitable giving. 
Theoretically, the implications of interdependent utility can be 
extended to the distribution aspect of private charitable contributions. 
In addition to the notations used in the small-numbers case men-
tioned above, it is now assumed that there are two income recipients, 
individuals 3 and 4. The donations of the rich are allocated between 
individuals 3 and 4. Now under the traditional assumptions, individuals 
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1 and 2 each maximize their utility function, ui = ui(x;, x3, x4), where 
i = 1, 2, taking other• s donations as given, subject to these 
constraints: 
where Wij indicates the contributions to individual j from individual i. 
If it is assumed that individual 3 is less poor than individual 4, i.e., 
Y3 > Y4, then according to the assumption of the utility fonction, this 
indicates that u1 < u!. 
For the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to be fulfilled, this implies that 
wi/U~ - Uj) = o and u~ - u] ;;, o, where i = 1, 2; j = 3, 4. If wij > o, 
i i 1 1 then Ui = Uj. For individual 1, the equilibrium conditions are u1 = u3 
and Ui = U~. Aggregating the marginal benefits horizontally from 
individuals 3 and 4, U~ + U~, yields the total marginal benefits from 
contributions of individual 1, U~+4• Thus, the general equilibrium 
condition for individual 1 is Ui = U~+4 in an aggregate sense. From 
this, the optimal allocation of contributions between individuals 3 and 
4 requires each recipient to have the amount of contributions for which 
the marginal benefit from each recipient is equal to the common value of 
marginal cost and total marginal benefits at the equilibrium 
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contribution. Because the marginal utility of individual 1 with respect 
to the consumption of individual 3 is less than that with respect to the 
consumption of individual 4 before the donations are made, for the equi-
librium conditions to be attained, the allocation of donations to indi-
victual 4 should be greater than that to individual 3 at equilibrium. 
This is shown in Figure 6. The mb'(= U~) line is above the mb(= U~) 
1 1 line which indicates that u4 > u3• At the equilibrium, individual l's 
contributions to the poor (individuals 3 and 4) are w1 = w13 + w14, 
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Figure 6. Allocations of Private Giving 
Among Recipients 
w 
Assume now that there is another person, individual 5, whose income 
y5 is greater than y3 or y4, but less than y1. Accordingly, U~ > U~ > 
1 1 1 1 1 u5• The equilibrium conditions can be extended as u1 = u3, u1 = u4, and 
Ui = U~. In Figure 6, the mb 11 (= U~) curve is far below mb and mb' 
curves, and there is no intersection between mb 11 and AB, which repre-
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sents the common value of marginal cost and total marginal benefits at 
the equilibrium level. This indicates that the income of individual 5 
is relatively high and the utility benefit for individual 1 from giving 
to individual 5 is less than the utility loss he sacrifices rlue to the 
reduction of his own consumption, or is less than the utility benefits 
from giving to individuals 3 and 4. There will be, therefore, no giving 
to individual 5 from individual 1. 
However, if the income of individual 1 is increased from y1 to Yi, 
the marginal cost curve of individual 1 will shift downward to me', due 
to the decreasing marginal utility of his own consumption. Now, giving 
to individual 5 becomes beneficial to individual 1. Thus, the equilib-
rium condition is obtained and the amount of giving is w15. 
From this analysis, it can be generalized that donors may give to 
some non-poor people such as individual 5 when their incomes are 
increased. This will definitely change the distribution of donors' 
giving and make the contribution in general more progressive, although 
the amounts of giving to the poor (individuals 3 and 4) would also be 
raised, w13 and w14 • 
From Becker's (1974) theory, we know that the effect of the price 
1 of giving is introduced through the marginal cost side, i.e., me= p1u1• 
Thus, other things unchanged, a decrease in the price of giving will 
have the same effect as an increase of donors' income. Therefore, the 
implications of interdependent utility not only lie in the size of 
private contributions, but also in the distribution of private 
contributions. 
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In summary, the nature of utility interdependence is related to both 
the size and distribution of private contributions. Thus, variables such 
as income, the "price" of contribution, the income distribution before 
transfers, the size of government transfers and their distributions, 
which determine the size of private contributions, may well affect the 
distribution of private contributions. Also, as in the case of bilateral 
monopoly, in small numbers case, there are several different strategies 
which depend upon the reactions of others conjectured by individuals; 
i.e., different possible values for v1 and m1 • Therefore, the final out-
come depends on the bargaining strength and skills of the parties 
involved. In other words, the relaxation of Nash conjectures in the 
small numbers case need not have an efficient outcome. This implies that 
the relationship between private welfare transfers and the number of 
donors might not be negative even if private welfare transfers actually 
take on the character of public goods. Fortunately, there is another way 
to examine the Nash conjectures hypothesis. From the analysis we know 
that the perfect substitution relationship between government transfers 
and private welfare transfers (minus unity) is the sufficient and neces-
sary condition for the Nash conjectures hypothesis. The relationship 
between private and public transfers, therefore, is useful in the inves-
tigation of both utility interdependence and Nash conjectures. 
• 
CHAPTER V 
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
Data Sources 
For testing the redistributive effects of public and private income 
transfers and the public goods character of private welfare income 
transfers, cross-sectional data on the 28 SMSA's (Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Area) for the year 1972-73 have been collected. The primary 
data are from Consumer Expenditure Survey: Integrated Survey Data for 
Metropolitan Areas, 1972-73 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1981). This 
survey was conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics primarily to 
revise the Consumer Price Index, but it is a valuable base for distrib-
utive studies because of its provision of information on numerous 
expenditures and income sources by income class for SMSA's. 
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) offers a clear classification 
of family income sources, including public transfers such as social 
security, railroad retirment, public assistance, veteran's compensation, 
and government retirement, and private transfers including private pen-
sions, income from estates and trusts, and regular contributions for 
support (e.g., regular private contributions, alimony and child 
support). Public assistance, income from estates and trusts, and regu-
lar contributions for support are defined in this study as welfare-type 
income transfers; the rest of the above are insurance-type transfers. 
Two transfer incomes, incomes from estates and trusts and workmen's 
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compensation, were deleted from our sample because they are lumped with 
other non-transfer incomes and it is not possible to identify them 
separately. 
One weakness of the CES is that the income transfers are distrib-
uted in a rather rough manner by income class. Furthermore, there is 
inconsistency in grouping among SMSA's, eighteen have 2 income inter-
vals, six have 3 income intervals, and four have 7 income intervals. 
The income intervals are: under $12,000 and over $12,000 in the 
2-interval case; under $6,000, $6,000-12,000, and over $12,000 in the 
3-interval case; under $4,000, two $2,000 increments up to $8,000, 
$8,000-12,000, $12,000-15,000, $15,000-20,000, and over $20,000 in the 
7-interval case. In order to be consistent and to conform with 
theoretical requirements, two income intervals will be used in 
calculations for all SMSA's. 
The Empirical Model and the Variables 
In this section an empirical model is presented based on the con-
ceptual framework developed for this study. This model consists of an 
examination of redistributive effects of public and private income 
transfers and a test of the public goods character of private welfare 
income transfers. Additionally, a description is provided of the vari-
ables employed in the regressions. The variables are: 
GIN!= the Gini coefficient of after-transfer (both 
public and private) family income. 
GINIG = the Gini coefficient of family income after 
public transfers. 
GINIP = the Gini coefficient of family income after 
private transfers. 
BINI= the Gini coefficient of before-transfer (both 
public and private} family income. 
APTR = the average (effective} private transfer rate. 
AGTR = the average (effective} public transfer rate. 
MPTR = the degree of private transfer progressivity, or 
the distribution of private transfers. 
MGTR = the degree of public transfer progressivity, or 
the distribution of public transfers. 
APWTR = the average private welfare income transfer per 
family. 
MPWTR = the degree of private welfare income transfer 
progressivity, or the distribution of private welfare 
transfers. 
AGTRV = the average public income transfer per family. 
(APTR}(MPTR}, (AGTR}(MGTR} = the interaction variables. 
INCOM = the average income per family. 
PRICE= the average price of private charitable giving. 
POP= the population size. 
u1, u2, u3 = error terms. 
i = a geographic entity (SMSA}. 
Redistributive Effects 
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Total Effects. Total redistributive effect is defined as comparing 
an income distribution before transfers with an income distribution 
after transfers. Both total redistributive effects of public and 
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private transfers will be calculated for each SMSA. According to the 
decomposition analysis developed in Chapter IV, it notes that to compare 
the redistributive effects between public and private transfers, we need 
to isolate the effect of underlying distribution from the effect of 
transfers on final income distribution. Therefore, we calculate the 
total redistributive effects of public and private transfers, respec-
tively, by employing the same basis of underlying distribution. This 
can be expressed as follows: 
Rgi = (BINI; - GINIG;)/BINI; ( 5. 1) 
and 
Rpi = (BINI; - GINIP; )/BINI; (5.2) 
where Rg; and Rpi are the total redistributive effects of public and 
private transfers, respectively. 
Marginal Effects. In examining the marginal redistributive effects 
of income transfers, the regression test will be run with cross-
sectional data for 28 SMSA's (1972-73), in an attempt to explain differ-
ences in income distribution between SMSA's. The perfect equality of 
incomes is used as an implicit standard even though it may be rejected 
as the ultimate equity objective. It is hypothesized that income 
inequality is associated with a number of independent variables, as 
depicted in the followintj regression equation: 
GHJii = a1 + a2(APTRi) + a3(MPTRi) + a4(AGTRi) 
+ a5(MGTRi) +a5(APTR;)(MPTRi) + a7(AGTRi)(MGTR;) (5.3) 
+ ag(BINii) + u1 
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Although there is a nonlinearity in the equation, it applies only to the 
independent variables (interaction terms), not to the parameters. 
Therefore, conventional least squares techniques can still be used to 
estimate the regression coefficients (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981). 
By taking partial derivatives, the marginal effects of public and 
private transfer rates and degrees of progressivity on after-transfer 
income distribution, the marginal redistributive effects, are derived as 
follows: 
a(GINI)/a(AGTR) = a4 + a7(MGTR) ( 5. 4) 
a(GINI)/a(APTR) = a2 + a6 (MPTR) ( 5. 5) 
a (GIN I) I a ( MGTR) = a5 + a7 ( AGTR) (5.6) 
a(GINI)/a(MPTR) = a3 + a6(APTR) ( 5. 7) 
The magnitudes of the marginal redistributive effects of public and 
private transfer rates (progressivities) depend on the values of their 
transfer progressivities (rates), respectively. Setting (5.4), (5.5), 
(5.6), and (5.7) each equal to zero, we have 
Accordingly, we expect that 
MGTR = -a4/a7 
MPTR = -a2/a6 
AGTR = -a5/a7 
APTR = -a3/a6 
61 
> > a(GINI)/a(AGTR) ~- 0, if MGTR ~ -a4/a7 and a7 > 0, 
a(GINI)/a(APTR): 0, if MPTR: -a2/a6 and a6 > 0, 
> > a(GINI)/a(MGTR) < 0, if AGTR < -a5;a7 and a7 > 0, 
a(GINI)/a(MPTR) ~ 0, if APTR; -a3/a6 and a6 > O; 
and 
> < a(GINI)/a(AGTR) < 0, if MGTR > -a4/a7 and a7 < 0, 
a(GINI)/a(APTR) ~ 0, if MPTR ~ -a2/a6 and a6 < 0, 
a(GINI)/a(MGTR) ~ 0, if AGTR ~ -a5/a7 and a7 < 0, 
a(GINI)/a(MPTR); 0, if APTR ~ -a3/a6 and a6 < o. 
a(GINI)/a(AGTR) > O (a(GINI)/a(APTR) > O) indicates that the redistribu-
tive effect of public (private) income transfers is against the poor, 
i.e., the increase in the public (private) income transfer rate will 
cause the final income to be less equally distributed. On the contrary, 
if a(GINI)/a(AGTR) < O (a(GINI)/a(APTR) < 0), then the increase in the 
public (private) income transfer rate will have a pro-poor marginal 
redistributive effect. Of course, there is no marginal redistributive 
effect whatsoever, if a(GINI)/a(AGTR) = 0 (a(GINI)/a(APTR) = 0). 
Similarly, a(GINI)/a(MGTR) > 0 (a(GINI)/a(MPTR) > 0) means that the 
increase in the degree of public (private) transfer progressivity \vill 
make the final income distribution less equal. On the contrary, if 
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a(GINI}/a(MGTR} < O (a(GINI}/a(MPTR} < 0), the increase in the degree of 
public (private} transfer progressivity will have a pro-poor marginal 
redistributive effect. There will be no effect, if a(GINI}/a(MGTR} = O 
(a(GINI}/a(MPTR} = 0). Whether the marginal redistributive effects of 
public and private transfer rates and progressivities are pro-poor, pro-
rich, or neutral depends on the values of their multiplicative counter-
parts which, in turn, are determined by the coefficients in (5.3). 
Further, by setting 
a(GINI}/a(AGTR} = a(GINI}/a(APTR} 
and 
a ( G rn I} /a ( MGTR } = a (GIN I} I a ( MPTR } ' 




From (5.8) ((5.9)), we can derive numerous pairs of values of public and 
private transfer progressivities (rates}, for which the marginal redis-
tributive effect of the public income transfer rate (progressivity) is 
equal to the marginal redistributive effect of the private income trans-
fer rate (progressivity), i.e., 11 isoeffect11 curves. These two relation-
ships are plotted in Figure 7. The shape of the lines depends on the 
values and signs of intercept terms, (a2/a7} - (a4/a7) and (a3/a7 
- a5/a7}, respectively, and slope coefficients, a6/a7. Each has four 
possible cases: 
For (5.8), 
(a) (a2/a7) - (a4/a7) > 0 and (a6/a7} > 0, 
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(c) (a2/a7) - (a4/a7) < 0 and (a6/a7) > 0, 
(d) (a2/a7) - (a4/a7) < 0 and (a6/a7) < O. 
For (5.9), 
(a) (a3/a7) - (a5/a7) > 0 and ( a6/a7) > 0, 
(b) (a3/a7) - (a5/a7) > 0 and (a6/a7) < 0, 
( c) (a3/a7) - (a5/a7) < 0 and ( a6/a7) > 0, 
(d) (a3/a7) - (a5/a7) < 0 and (a6/a7) < o. 
The case notations here correspond to the notation used in Figure 7. 
The points along the lines represent the combinations of public and 
private transfer· progressivities (rates), for which the marginal effects 
of public and private transfer rates (progressivities) upon income dis-
tribution are the same. For the points off the lines, the comparison of 
the marginal redistributive effects of public and private transfer rates 
depends on the signs of the coefficients, a6 and a7. 
(1) If a6/a7 > 0, i.e., cases (a) and (c), the signs of a6 and 
a7 will be either both positive or both negative (see Figure 7). 
( i) a6 > 0, a7 > O 
The points appearing above the lines indicates that the 
actual value of MGTR (OD) exceeds the value on the line (OE), given the 
value of MPTR (OB); or that the actual value of MPTR (OB) is far less 
than the value on the line (OC), given the value of MGTR (OD). Thus, 
from (5.4) and (5.5), we know that 
a(GINI)/a(AGTR) > a(GINI)/a(APTR). 
This implies that the public transfer rate should play a relatively 
smaller role than the private transfer rate with respect to the redis-
tribution of income. Thus, if both have negative (pro-poor) marginal 
redistributive effects, the private transfer rate should be increased 
relatively more than the public transfer rate; if both have positive 
(pro-rich) marginal redistributive effects, the public transfer rate 
should be decreased relatively more than the private transfer rate. 
(ii ) a 6 < 0, a7 < 0 
Again from (5.4) and (5.5), the points above the lines 
indicate that 
a(GINI)/a(AGTR) < a(GINI)/a(APTR). 
This implies that the public transfer rate should play a relatively 
larger role than the private transfer rate with respect to income 
redistribution. 
For points below the lines, the results will be reversed. 
(2) If a5/a7 < 0, i.e., cases (b) and (d), the signs of a5 and 
a7 will be either a5 > 0, a7 < O or a5 < 0, a7 > O (see Figure 7). 
( i ) a5 < 0, a7 > 0 
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The points above the line indicate that the actual value 
of MGTR (OG) exceeds the value on the line (OF), given the value 
(OK); or that the actual value of MPTR (OK) exceeds the value on 
line (OJ), given the value of MGTR (OG). Thus, from (5.4) and 
(5.5), we know that 
a(GINI)/a(AGTR) > a(GINI)/a(APTR). 
Therefore, the implication is the same as (1)--(i) above. 
(ii) a5 > 0, a7 < O 
of MPTR 
the 
Again from (5.4) and (5.5), the points above the line 
indicate that 
a(GINI)/a(AGTR) < a(GINI)/a(APTR). 
Thus, the implication is the same as (1)--(ii). 
For points below the lines, the results will be reversed. 
In a similar manner, we can derive the following conclusions for 
the comparison of public and private transfer progressivities: 
(1) If a5/a7 > 0, 
( i ) and a5 > 0, a7 > 0, 
then a (GIN I ) I a ( MGTR ) > a(GINI)/a(MPTR). 
(ii) When a5 < O, a7 < O, 
then a(GINI)/a(MGTR) < a(GINI)/a(MPTR). 
( 2) If a6/a7 < 0, 
( i) and a6 < 0, a7 > 0, 
then a (GIN I ) I a ( MGTR ) > a(GINI)/a(MPTR). 
( ii) When a6 > O, a7 < O, 
then a(GINI)/a(MGTR) < a(GINI)/a(MPTR). 
For ease of exposition, we present the summary results in Table II. 
A Test of the Public Goods Character of 
Private Welfare Income Transfers 
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In the investigation of the interdependent utility and Nash con-
jectures hypotheses in testing the allocative efficiency of private 
welfare income transfers, the relationships of primary analytic interest 
should be translated into operational form, suitable for explaining 
interarea differences in welfare income transfers. The fitted equations 
are, in linear form: 
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TABLE II 
CHARACTERISTICS OF MARGINAL REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE TRANSFER RATES AND PROGRESSIVITIES 
A. Transfer rates 
a. Points on the line 
b. Points above the line 
1. a6/a7 > 0 
(i) a5<0, a7>0 
(ii) a5>0, a7<0 
c. Points below the line 
1. a5/a7>0 
( i) a5<0, a7>0 
(ii) a5>0, a7<0 
Cases (a) and (c) 
in Figure 7 for 
equation (5.8). 
Cases (b) and (d) 
in Figure 7 for 
equation (5.8). 
Cases (a) and (c) 
in Figure 7 for 
equation (5.8). 
No differences in redistrib-
utive effects between public 
and private transfer rates. 
Public transfer rate should 
play a relatively smaller 
role in income red1str16u-
tion than private transfer 
rate. 
Public transfer rate should 
play a relatively larger 
role in income red1str1bu-
tion than private transfer 
rate. 
As (1)--(i) above. 
As (1)--(ii) above. 
Public transfer rate should 
play a relatively larger 
role in income red1str1bu-
tion than private transfer 
rate. 
Public transfer rate should 
play a relatively smaller 
role in income red1str16u-
tion than private transfer 
. rate. 
Cases (b) and (d) 
in Figure 7 for 
equation (5.8). 
As (1)--(i) above. 
As (1)--(ii) above. 
B. Transfer progressivities--The conditions and results are the same as 
(A), except that the corresponding cases are for equation (5.9). 
and 
APWTRi = b1 + b2(INCOMi) + b3(PRICEi) + b4(BINii) 
+ b5(POPi) + b5(AGTRVi) + b7(MGTRi) + u2, 
MPWTRi =Cl+ c2(INCONi) + c3(PRICEi) + c4(8INii) 




and, in logarithmic form: 
and 
Log(APWTRi) = b1 + b2 Log(INCOMi) + b3 Log(PRICEi) 
+ b4 Log(BINii) + b5 Log(POPi) + b5 Lo9 (AGTRVi) 
+ b7 Log(MGTRi) + u2, (5.12) 
Log(MPWTRi) = c1 + c2 Log(INCOMi) + c3 Log(PRICE;) 
+ c4 Log(BINii) + c5 Log(AGTRVi) 
+ C6 Log (MGTRi) + u3. (5.13) 
Both linear and logarithmic fits will be attempted. The meaning of 
coefficients in these two forms is distinctive; the coefficient of the 
logarithmic form represents the elasticity of the independent variables 
with respect to the dependent variable. Furthermore, in the logarithmic 
form we assume that independent variables have a multiplicative effect 
on the dependent variable. From previous studies (for example, Hochman 
and Rodgers, 1973; Schwartz, 1970; Feldstein, 1975a), we expect that the 
logarithmic form will be of greater statistical significance than the 
linear form. It is worthwhile, at this point, to note that the measure-
ment of MPWTR and MGTR in (5.12) and (5.13) is quite different from the 
one employed in the other equations. Due to the special characteristic 
of logarithmic functions, only positive values can have logarithms. 
This will be further explained in the following section. 
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Variables 
The above equations indicate the relationships we wish to estimate. 
Values for most of the variables are derived indirectly from primary 
data sources through technical operations. Therefore, it is necessary 
here to illuminate and display, in more detail, the variables employed 
in the analysis, their calculations, and relationship to the models. 
Before- and After-Transfer Income Distributions (BINI, GINIG, 
GINIP, and GIN!). The Gini concentration ratio will be used in the 
quantification of these four variables to show the dispersion of (money) 
income before and after income transfers • .Among its weaknesses, 
Gastwirth (1972) argues that the estimation of Gini ratios from grouped 
data has a bias that makes the numerical estimates systematically too 
low. The Gini estimates are lower bounds on the true concentration 
ratio because income variability within groups is neglected. The bias 
is smaller the more observations there are. The data used in this study 
have far fewer intervals than are necessary for small magnitudes of 
error. For CES data, there is inconsistency in grouping among SMSA's; 
eighteen with 2 intervals, six with 3 intervals, and four with 7 inter-
vals. Fortunately, the burden of this analysis is to trace the differ-
ences in the size distribution of income among areas. The basic 
criticism of numerical studies of this kind carries less force in this 
case because the differences, if any, in a more comprehensive measure of 
the size distribution of income is at issue. The calculations need not 
be formally correct in all dimensions but must only yield an unbiased 
approximation of the differences in income distributions among areas. 
It is assumed that any biases are in the same direction and of similar 
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magnitude in all areas. This ensures that the exaggerated effect caused 
by the measure of the distribution itself would be alleviated and the 
distributive differences will be of the appropriate direction and magni-
tude (Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977; Benus and Morgan, 1975). Therefore, 
to be consistent, we chose a two-income intervals case--under $12,000 
and over $12,000--as the basis for computing the Gini ratios for all 28 
SMSA's. 
The formula used in computing the Gini index is expressed as 
fol 1 ows: 
n 
GIN! = 1 - I: (Fi+l - Fi) (Yi + Yi+l). 
i=l 
Where F1 is the cumulative population share of the ith group ranked 
according to total income and Yi is its cumulative income share. This 
is a trapezoidal derivation of the Gini ratio (Bronfenbrenner, 1971; 
Mi 11 er, 1966) .1 
The income figures presented in the CES represent the amounts of 
income received by families before deduction for personal income taxes, 
but they include transfer incomes. To derive the before-transfer income 
distribution, a decomposition of the inequality index into the contribu-
tions arising from different income sources is necessary. The following 
formula is empl oyed2 
lFor other approximations of Gini ratio, refer to the excellent 
discussions in Theil (1972), Kakwani and Podder (1976), and Kakwani 
(1976). 
2This is one of the applications of the Lorenz curve discussed in 
Kakwani (1977). For the discussions on the impact of income components 
on the distribution of income, see Fei, Ranis, and Kuo (1978); Pyatt, 
Chen, and Fei (1980); and Shorrocks (1983). Note that if Gini indices 
of income comoonents are instead employed in the forr,ula, it will only 
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n 
GINI = 1/µ E µkCk. 
k=l 
(5.14) 
Whereµ is the mean income of all income units, Ck is the concentration 
index of the kth income component (see the explanation of measures of 
transfer progressivity in latter section) and µk is the mean of the kth 
income component of all income units. 
This indicates that the concentration ratio of total incomes is a 
weighted average of concentration ratios of its income components and 
the weight is each income components' share of total incomes. For 
example, if the first income component is defined as transfer incomes 
including both public and private transfers, then the income distribu-
tion before transfers is as follows. 
First, 
where C1 is the concentration ratio of transfer incomes, C2 is the con-
centration ratio of non-transfer incomes, µ1(µ2) is the mean of transfer 
(non-transfer) incomes of all income units, µ1/µ (µ2/µ) is the transfer 
(non-transfer) income share of total incomes. 
Then, we have 
This before-transfer income distribution fails to adjust for 
2(continued) provide the upper bound of the Gini index of the total 
income. This is because the income components may be any function of 
total income; but not necessarily be a nondecreasing function of total 
income. Consult Kakwani (1977) for details. 
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transfer-induced labor supply and living arrangements effects, a common 
omission in studies of this type. Therefore, we expect that the true 
before-transfer income is likely to be less unequally distributed than 
measured before-transfer income (see Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977; 
Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick, 1981). The income disperson before 
transfers is used (1) as a summary measure representing all other fac-
tors which have effects on income distribution and (2) to examine the 
interdependent relationship between income transferors and transferees. 
It is noted that because the relevant potential recipient groups are not 
known, the measurement of income dispersion for all grours is used as a 
substitute here. 
Similarly, the income distribution after public transfers (GINIG) 
and the income distribution after private transfers (GINIP) can be 
derived as follows: 
GINIG = (µ11C11 + µ2C2)/(µ11 + µ2), 
GINIP = (u12C12 + µ2C2)/(u12 + µ2), 
where µ11(µ12) is the mean of public (private) transfer incomes of 
all income units, µ11 + µ12 = u1, and C11(C12) is the concentration 
ratio of public (private) transfer incomes. 
Average Transfer Rates and Transfer Progressivities (APTR, AGTR, 
MPTR, MGTR, and MPWTR). The average transfer rates, APTR and AGTR, are 
measured by computing the values of private and public income transfers 
as a percentage of the total before-transfer income, respectively. 
Specifically, they can be expressed as: 
APTR(AGTR) 
Value of private income transfers 
= (public income transfers) in each SMSA 
Value of total before-transfer 
income in each SMSA 
All these values can be directly obtained from the CES. It is assumed 
that the total incomes before or after transfers will be the same. It 
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should be noted here that the average transfer rate is identical to the 
proportion that transfer income is of total income as defined above. 
In this study, two summary measures of transfer progressivity are 
employed. One of them is inspired by and related to the aforementioned 
concentration ratio. Its calculation is expressed as follows: 
n 
Ck= 1 - ~ (Fi+l - Fi)(Yi,k + Yi+l, k), 
i=l 
where Ck is the concentration ratio of transfer income, Yi ,k is the 
cumulative transfer income share of ith group ranked according to the 
total income, and Fi is its cumulative popuatlion share. 
From the definition of a concentration ratio, we know that Ck rep-
resents the distribution of transfer income. Similarly, it can be 
applied to the derivation of a single statistic to describe whether a 
transfer is progressive, proportional, or regressive. According to the 
analysis developed, the smaller is the value of Ck (MPTR, MGTR, or 
MPWTR), the more regressive or less progressive the transfer will be, 
given the underlying income distribution. If Ck is less (greater) than 
the Gini of the before-transfer income distribution (BINI), the transfer 
is defined as regressive (progressive). 
For the progressivity index, Ck, as for the Gini index, a single 
measure can be misleading. For example, two concentration curves which 
intersect can be associated with identical concentration indexes. The 
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index, Ck, measures the average progressivity of a transfer across the 
entire income range, yet some transfers, as shown in Figure 8, are 
progressive over one range of incomes and regressive over another 
(Atkinson, 1970; Davies, 1980). Although careful interpretation and 
caution are warranted, this limitation is common to all averages and 
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Figure 8. Concentration Curves for Transfer Incomes 
The values of Ck could be positive or negative. Mathematically, we 
cannot take logarithMs on negative values. Therefore, the estiMation of 
(5.12) and (5.13) cannot be done. To solve this problem, we need to 
change the measures of MGTR and MPWTR in (5.12) and (5.13). 
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Suits (1977) attempts to attack the old problem of discovering a single 
index to represent the degree of tax progressivity. To do so, he 
applies the concept of the Lorenz curve to the derivation of a summary 
index of progressivity. Instead of focusing on the relationship between 
the cumulative percent of income units and the cumulative percent of 
income, he develops an index indicating the relationship between the 
cumulative percent of total tax burden and the cumulative percent of 
total income. Applying Suits' index to the case of transfers, it can be 
expressed as follows: 
n 
S = 1 I: ('Yi + 1 - Yi ) (Ti + Ti + 1 ) • 
i=l 
Where Y1 is the cumulative income share of the ith group ranked accord-
ing to total income and Ti is its cumulative transfer share. 
With a regressive transfer, Swill be negative since the Lorenz-
like curve lies above the diagonal; with a progressive transfer, Swill 
be positive since the Lorenz-like curve lies below the diagonal. 
Because the transfers are expected to be regressive in an aggregate 
sense, the S indexes of MPWTR and MGTR would be negative for most 
SMSA's.3 One way of transforming the values of S into positive figures 
is to reverse the variables on the two axes used in plotting the Lorenz-
like curve, i.e., as opposed to Suits' illustration, we set the 
3By using the measurement of S index, all 28 observations have 
negative values for MGTR and, of them, 26 observations have negative 
values for MPWTR. Although the transfers are expected to be regressive 
in an aggregate sense, the signs of MGTR and MPWTR measured by Ck will 
still be vague, since a transfer is defined as regressive, if Ck is less 
than BINI, not zero. As a matter of fact, by using the measurement of 
Ck, only 25 and 16 observations have negative values for MGTR and MPWTR, 
respectively. 
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cumulative percent of income on the vertical axis and cumulative percent 
of the transfers on the horizontal axis. In other words, the definition 
of the S index is refined as 
n 
S1 = 1 - r (Ti+l - Ti)(Yi + Yi+l). 
i=l 
By applying this approach to measures of MPWTR and MGTR, we can trans-
form all values into positive figures, except two in MPWTR. Accord-
ingly, the estimation of (5.12) and (5.13) can he performed. Deleting 
the two exceptions from our sample, we conduct the estimation of (5.13) 
with 26 observations. For comparison, we also utilize S1 to estimate 
the linear equations of (5.10) and (5.11). It should be noted that, 
although Suits' index is useful in this respect, it does not have the 
arithmetically additive relationship shown in (5.14). In addition, con-
trary to the case for the Ck and the S indices, a transfer is defined as 
regressive (progressive), if S1 is greater (less) than zero. 
Interaction Terms [(APTR)(MPTR), (AGTR)(MGTR)]. According to the 
analysis developed, there is a multiplicative effect of transfer rates 
and progressivities on income distribution. Statistically, interaction 
terms are often included in models in which one does not believe that 
right-hand explanatory variables have the same effect on dependent vari-
ables, whatever the values of the other right-hand variables. In the 
case of transfers, this means that the effect of the private (public) 
transfer rate upon the Gini index is dependent on the value of its 
counterpart, transfer progressivity, and vice versa. 
Average Public Income Transfers Per Family and Average Private 
Welfare Income Transfers Per Family (AGTRV and APWTR). AGTRV is derived 
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by adding up the values of the separate transfer coMponents shown in the 
CES, divided by total families in each SMSA. The reported private wel-
fare income transfers, divided by total families in each SMSA, are used 
as the empirical counterpart of APWTR. The private welfare income 
transfer here is defined from the receiving, not the giving, side. This 
indicates that it includes the welfare incomes from individuals and 
other intermediaries. Here it is assumed that the theory of individual 
giving can be extended to other private philanthropic counterparts; 
namely, the behaviors of intermediaries would depend on their donors.4 
Income, Price, and Donors {INCOM, PRICE, and POP). The measure of 
per family income is obtained from average income before tax per family 
in each SMSA. There have been several definitions of income employed in 
previous studies. Taussig (1967) uses income net of taxes paid. 
Feldstein and Taylor (1976) argue that to avoid the dependence of income 
upon contributions, the correct variable should be income net of the 
taxes that would have been paid if there had been no charitable deduc-
tion. Reece {1979) argues, however, that the income variable could be 
endogenous in the model, since it is possible for contributions plus 
expenditures on goods to exceed income as defined by Feldstein and 
Taylor. Thus, the correct definition seems to be gross income. In this 
study, Reece 1 s suggestion is employed. 
The average price is measured as: 1 minus the average value of 
personal income taxes paid per family as a percentage of the average 
income before taxes per family. This is considered to be a very rough 
4see Orr (1976) for a discussion about a similar application 
to the government. 
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approximation of the price for each individual. The income variable in 
the denominator should be measured by taxable income, since not all 
income are subject to the personal income tax. The taxes paid in the 
numerator should be defined as the taxes which would have been paid 
before taking account of charitable deductions (Reece, 1979). There-
fore, the measure used here must be interpreted with caution. 
The actual population of income transfer donors for each SMSA is 
not available. Thus, the general population (families) is used as a 
rough proxy. 
Hypotheses About the Signs of the 
Regression Coefficients 
Table III illustrates the expected signs of coefficients in the 
regression models. As opposed to the Ck measurement of MGTR and MPWTR 
in equations (5.10) and (5.11), the S1 index is employed in equations 
(5.lOa) and (5.lla). If the interactive relationship between the trans-
fer rate and progressivity does not exist, intuitively a regressive 
(progressive) income transfer will make the after-transfer income more 
(less) equally distributed, ~iven other factors constant. In other 
words, positive signs are expected on the coefficients of MPTR and MGTR 
(i.e., a3 and a5). The responses of average transfer rates with respect 
to the Gini coefficient of after-transfer income depend on the natures 
of the progressivity indexes. Average transfer rates will respond posi-
tively (negatively) to the Gini coefficient of after-transfer income, if 
the progressivity indexes indicate that the income transfers are prog-
ressive (regressive), given other factors constant (including the prog-
ressivity index). Although some features of public and private income 
TABLE II I 
EXPECTED SIGNS OF COEFFICIENTS 
Equation Dependent 
Numbers Variable APTR AGTR MPTR MGTR (APTR)(MPTR) ( AGTR) ( MGTR) BINI INC OM PRICE POP AGTRV 
( 5. 3) GINI ± ± ± ± + + ± 
( 5.10) APWTR + + + 
( 5. lOa) APWTR + + 
( 5. 11) MPWTR + + 
(5.lla) MPWTR + + 
(5.12) APWTR + + 
(5.13) MPWTR + + 
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transfers are detrimental to the achievement of the objective of reducing 
poverty and income inequality, still their redistributive effects are 
likely to be pro-poor in an aggregate sense (Danziger, Haveman, and 
Plotnick, 1981; Lampman, 1972; Morgan, David, Cohen, and Brazer, 1962). 
In other words, they are regressive in general. Accordingly, negative 
signs are expected on the coefficients of APTR and AGTR (i.e., a2 and a4). 
However, as the interaction terms representing tile multiplicative 
relationship between transfer rate and progressivity are employed, the 
responses of them with respect to the Gini coefficient of after-transfer 
income become vague, i.e., the signs of a2, a3, a4, and a5 are uncer-
tain. Other than themselves, the marginal redistributive effects of 
transfer rate and progressivity depend on the value of their multipli-
cative counterparts. For example, the marginal redistributive effect of 
AGTR is as follows 
a(GINI)/a(AGTR) = a4 + a7(MGTR). 
Here, a4 becomes the intercept term and it could be either positive or 
negative. 
According to the arithmetically additive relationship developed, it 
is noted that the average transfer rate is regarded as a "scalar" to 
transfer progressivity in determining the magnitude of the redistrib-
utive effect. For example, from (5.14) and definitions of variables 
described above, we have 
GINI = (µ11/µ)C11 + (µ12/µ)C12 + (µ2/µ)C2 
= (AGTR)(MGTR) + (APTR)(MPTR) + (µ2/µ)(BINI).· 
Therefore, we expect that the signs of the interaction variables in (5.3) 
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are all positive. As MGTR and MPTR, due to the multiplicative relation-
ship between non-transfer income proportion (µ2/µ) and before-transfer 
distribution, the expected sign of BINI could be either positive or 
negative.5 
Higher income among individuals will result in higher transfers. 
The lower the price of transfers, the more transfers that will be sup-
plied. In addition, higher income and lower price may cause the distri-
bution of private welfare transfers (MPWTR) to be less sensitive to the 
poor relative to others. Therefore, in (5.10) and (5.11), positive 
signs are expected on the coefficients of INCOM with respect to APWTR. 
and MPWTR. As for the coefficients of PRICE with respect to APWTR and 
MPWTR, negative signs are expected. 
A less equal income distribution may encourage philanthropic behav-
ior and make the rich more sensitive to the poor in distributing their 
welfare income transfers. Public income transfers can substitute for 
some of the welfare recipients• incomes. Therefore, the larger or more 
regressive are public income transfers, the more they might discourage 
private welfare income transfers and make the rich less sensitive to the 
poor in the distribution of transfers. In summary, in (5.10) these 
considerations indicate that positive signs are expected on the coeffi-
cients of BINI and MGTR; and a negative sign is expected on the coeffi-
cient of AGTRV with respect to APWTR. Furthermore, in (5.11) negative 
signs are expected on the coefficients of BINI and MGTR; and a positive 
sign is expected on the coefficient of AGTRV with respect to MPWTR. 
5we have attempted to employ the interaction term, (µ2/µ)(BINI), in 
(5.3). Unfortunately, the multicollinearity between BINI and (µ2/µ)(BINI) 
causes the estimates of them to have high variances. Hence, this 
interaction term is dropped from (5.3). 
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Finally, the sign of the coefficient of POP is expected to be negative 
in accordance with the public goods character of private welfare income 
transfers. In contrast to equation (5.10), a negative sign is expected 
on the coefficient of MGTR in (5.lOa) and, as opposed to the signs of 
coefficients in (5.11), all but the sign of the coefficient of MGTR are 
expected to be reversed in (5.lla). It is noted that the expected signs 




· In Chapter IV we presented the theoretical framework of this study 
and in Chapter V we described the empirical model. The empirical 
results, based on regression analysis, are presented and evaluated in 
this chapter. The order of presentation follows the previously 
encountered two part division of redistributive effects and public goods 
character of private welfare income transfers. The results of OLS 
linear regression are provided in both the redistributive effects and 
public goods sections. Additionally, the results for two alternative 
measures of progressivity and two alternative functional forms are 
reported for the public goods equations. 
Redistributive Effects 
Total Effects 
The total redistributive effects of public and private transfers 
among 28 SMSA's are presented in Table IV. These figures are derived by 
using equations (5.1} and (5.2} in Chapter V. 
Table IV shows that the Gini coefficients after transfers are both 
variable and significantly different from the Gini coefficients before 
transfers (BINI} for all 28 SMSA's. The transfers, both publicly and 
privately provided, have reduced the Gini coefficient by 13.70 percent 
on average. Accounting for the contributions of public and private 
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TABLE IV 
TOTAL REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TRANSFERS AMONG 28 SMSA'S 
Percentage Reduction Percentage Reduction Percentage Reduction 
in GINI Due to Both in GINI Due to in GINI Due to 
Public and Private Public Income Private Income 
SMSA APTR% MPTR AGTR% MGTR GINI BINI Transfers Transfers Transfers 
1 1.62 -0.302 7.37 -0.102 0.300 0.343 12.54 9. 72 3.29 
2 1. 85 -0.053 6.04 -0. 347 0.256 0.302 15. 23 13.22 2.31 
3 2.90 -0.247 6.19 -0.291 0.270 o. 325 16.92 12.08 5.44 
4 1. 70 0.133 2.99 -0. 242 0.405 0.430 5.81 4.75 1. 21 
5 0.66 0.079 4.29 -0.187 0.279 0.302 7.62 6.99 0.51 
6 3.50 0.113 6.99 -0.056 0.267 0.298 10.40 8.60 2.34 
7 1. 77 0.196 5.07 -0.160 0.262 0.287 8. 71 8.03 0.59 
8 1. 57 -0.227 7.38 -0.239 0.248 0.296 16.22 13.57 3.18 
9 0.62 0.022 2.31 -0.044 0.239 0.337 29.08 2. 63 0.59 
10 0.83 -0.107 5. 71 -0.068 0.235 0.257 8.56 7.28 1. 24 
11 1. 71 -0.111 12.02 0.016 0.321 o. 372 13. 71 11. 70 2. 53 
12 1.11 -0.378 7.98 -0.166 0.302 0.351 13.96 11. 89 2. 51 
13 2.40 -0.170 8.19 -0.211 0.262 o. 317 17. 35 13. 98 4.02 
14 1. 26 -0.157 7.49 -0. 172 0.267 0.309 13. 59 11. 81 2.05 
15 1.66 -0.074 14.05 -0.075 0.219 0.274 20.07 18.20 2.46 
16 2,26 0.101 5.69 -0.081 0.286 0.313 8.63 7.33 1.63 
17 1. 61 0.325 7. 72 -0.192 0.296 0.337 12.17 12.32 0.06 
18 1. 44 -0.124 8.38 -0.224 0.308 o. 365 15. 62 13. 72 2.11 
19 1. 39 -0.239 6.53 -0.261 0.254 0.298 14. 77 12. 42 2.58 
20 1. 32 0.124 7.46 -0. 071 0.298 0.331 9.97 9.18 0.89 
21 1. 81 0.037 6.49 -0.317 0.270 0.316 14. 56 13.24 1. 71 
22 2.23 -0.190 11. 88 0.016 0.282 0.331 14.80 11.56 3. 98 
23 2.70 0.005 10.53 -0.228 0.290 0.362 19.89 17.64 2.97 
24 0.86 0.024 9.25 0.146 0.253 0.266 4.89 4.21 0.87 
25 1. 52 -0.169 5.89 -0.226 0.270 0.309 12. 62 10.36 2.50 
26 1. 68 -0.091 9.55 -0.185 0.308 0.368 16.30 14.60 2. 32 
27 2.21 -0. 104 8.43 -0.165 0.257 0.305 15.74 13. 28 3.24 
28 2.30 -0.041 8.19 -0.153 0.307 0.357 14.01 11. 98 2.80 




transfers to income redistribution separately, we find that the average 
percentage reduction in the Gini coefficients are 10.94 for public 
transfers and 2.21 for private transfers, respectively. The Gini reduc-
tion for public transfers is smaller here than in previous studies (see 
Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick, 1981). It is not surprising that public 
transfers have a much larger total redistributive effect than private 
transfers do. An examination of the values of transfer rates and 
progressivities indicates that (1) the average size of public trans-
fers (7.50 percent) is larger than that of private transfers (1.74 
percent), and (2) public transfers are distributed, on average, more 
pro-poor (-0.153) than private transfers are (-0.058). 
Marginal Effects 
In Table V we present a regression of after-transfer Gini coeffi-
cients on various independent variables. This equation represents the 
fully-specified marginal redistributive effects equation. 
For equation (5.1), about 85 percent of the variation in Gini 
coefficients can be explained by the seven independent variables. The 
coefficients of these variables have the predicted signs and, except for 
the average private transfer rate variable (APTR) and the private trans-
fer progressivity variable (MPTR), all are significant at the 90 percent 
level. In order to make statements about the relative importance of the 
independent variables in a multiple regression model, the beta coeffi-
cients are used. As a result of the normalization process, the beta 
coefficient of the constant term is undefined and dropped out (Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld, 1981). It is noted that before-transfer income distri-
bution (BINI), public transfer progressivity (MGTR), and the interaction 
term for public transfers appear to be three relatively most important 
TABLE V 
MARGINAL REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TRANSFERS 
Equation Dependent 
Number Variable Constant APTR MPTR AGTR MGTR ( APTR }( MPTR) 
( 5. 3) GINI -0.018 0.002 -0.068 0.003 -0.288 0.055 
(0.72) (0.48) (1. 34) (1.77)* (3.21}** (1.92)* 
[O] [0.039] [-0.311] [O. 211] [-0.906] [0.449] 
t ratios are given in parentheses. 
Beta coefficients, standardized regression coefficients, are given in brackets. 
*indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 90 percent level. 
**indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the 99 percent level. 
N = number of observations. 
( AGTR }( MGTR) BINI R2 
0.040 0.839 0.85** 





variables. A standard deviation change in the BINI, MGTR, and (AGTR) 
(MGTR) will lead to 0.884, 0.906, and 0.950 standard deviation changes 
in the GINI, respectively. Moreover, the sign of the coefficient of 
BINI is positive; this indicates that a less equal before-transfer 
distribution will have a less equal after-transfer distribution. 
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Table VI shows that the simple correlation coefficients between 
public and private transfer progressivities and their interaction terms 
are 0.91 and 0.94, respectively, and highly significant. Hence, the 
multicollinearity problem is present. This will lead to OLS estimates 
of parameters having.high variances. Normally the presence of high 
variances means that the parameter estimates are not precise and 
hypothesis testing is not very conclusive. However, this effect seems 
minor here. Although high collinearity exists, we still obtain good 
estimates; MGTR and (AGTR)(MGTR) are significant at a 99 percent level, 
and (APTR)(MPTR) is significant at a 90 percent level. In order to 
avoid the possible bias on the remaining variables due to dropping a 
relevant variable, we decided not to change the specification of the 
equation. The Durbin-Watson test was performed. The result shows that 
there is no serious serial correlation problem in (5.3). 
The marginal redistributive effects of public and private transfer 
rates and progressivities can be obtained as follows: 
a(GINI)/a(AGTR) = 0.003 + 0.040 (MGTR) 
a (GIN I ) I a ( APTR) = 0.055 (MPTR) 
a(GINI )/a(MGTR) = -0.288 + 0.040 (AGTR) 
a(GINI)/a(MPTR) = 0.055 (APTR). 
TABLE VI 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF GINI AND THE DETERMINANTS OF GINI 
GINI APTR MPTR AGTR MGTR ( APTR) ( MPTR) ( AGTR) ( MGTR) BINI 
GINI 1. 00 0.10 0.17 -0.11 -0.12 0.16 -0.00 0.89 
APTR 1.00 0.03 0.25 -0.19 -0.02 -0.29 0.14 
MPTR 1. 00 -0.26 0.11 0.94 0.20 0.02 
AGTR 1.00 0.34 -0.26 0.04 -0.03 
MGTR 1.00 0.15 0.91 -0.20 
( APTR) ( MPTR) 1.00 0.22 -0.00 




In taking the derivatives, the coefficients which are not significant at 
the 90 percent level are ommitted. Setting each equal to zero, we have 
MGTR = -0.072 
MPTR = 0 
AGTR = 7.27 (percent) 
APTR = 0 (percent) 
Accordingly, we expect that 
a(GINI)/a(AGTR) > 
< 
a(GINI)/a(APTR) > < 
a(GINI )/a(MGTR) > < 
a( GIN!) I a (MPTR) > 
< 
It is demonstrated that the sign 
> 0, if MGTR < 
0, if MPTR > < 
0, if AGTR > < 






of the marginal redis-
tributive effects of changes in transfer rates depend upon the level of 
transfer progressivity, and vice versa. The signs of the coefficients 
of the two interaction terms are both positive (0.055 and 0.04). This 
indicates :that a higher value for the degree of transfer progressivity 
(transfer rate) will increase the pro-rich or decrease the pro-poor 
marginal redistributive effect of the transfer rate (the degree of 
transfer progressivity). For example, the marginal effect of changes 
in the public transfer rate on income distribution is 0.003 (pro-rich), 
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when public transfer progressivity is zero. The marginal redistributive 
effect will become more pro-rich (0.007), if the public transfer 
progressivity is changed from zero to 0.01. 
Whether the marginal redistributive effect of the public transfer 
rate is pro-poor depends on the value of its progressivity. If the 
progressivity is less than -0.072, the public transfer rate will have a 
pro-poor marginal redistributive effect. Similarly, the public transfer 
progressivity will have a pro-poor marginal redistributive effect only 
when the transfer rate is less than 7.27 percent. In other words, an 
increase in public transfer progressivity, i.e., transfers becoming More 
progressive and pro-rich, does not necessarily have a pro-rich effect on 
the income distribution in a marginal sense. This is due to the Multi-
plicative interaction between the transfer rate and progressivity. The 
marginal redistributive effect is composed of the impacts of the change 
of one factor and the level of the other. The marginal redistributive 
effects of private transfer rate and progressivity are related in the 
same manner, except that the critical value of determination is zero for 
both the transfer rate and progressivity. Public income transfers are 
larger in size and more pro-poor than the private transfers; hence, the 
conditions for public transfers to have a further income-equalizing 
effect are much more strict than for private transfers. Further income 
equalization can be realized more easily by changing the private (rather 
than public) transfer rate and progressivity, for most of the "easy 
gains have been made" already for public transfers. 
To compare public transfers with private transfers further, we 
derive the equations of the lines representing equal public and private 
transfer redistributive effects discussed in Chapter V: 
MGTR = -0.075 + 1.375 (MPTR) 
AGTR = 7.2 + 1.375 (APTR). 
Because the coefficients of two interaction terms are positive, i.e., 
a6 > 0, a7 > 0, case (1) - (i) in Chapter V applies here. It is 
illustrated in Figure 9. 
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Given this case, we conclude that to reduce income inequality: (1) 
there is no marginal redistributive effect difference if the combina-
tions of the public transfer rate (progressivity) and private transfer 
rate (progressivity) lie on the 11 isoeffect 11 line CD (AB), (2) for all 
combinations above the lines, the private transfer rate (progressivity) 
should either be increased more or reduced less than the public transfer 
rate (progressivity), and (3) for all combinations below the lines, the 
public transfer rate (progressivity) should be either increased more or 








Figure 9. 11 Isoeffect 11 Curves for Public and Private 
Transfer Rates and Progressivities 
Public Goods Character of Private 
Welfare Transfers 
In Table VII we present the results of regressions derived from 
testing for the public goods character of private welfare transfers. 
Two equations were estimated for each alternative measure of transfer 
progressivity (Ck and S1), first in linear and then in log form. 
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Explanatory power (l{°2) ranged from -0.13 to O. 23. Without 
exception, l{°2 for the log form of (5.12) is higher than its linear 
counterpart (5.lOa), indicating that the relationship between average 
private welfare transfers per family and the independent variables is 
exponential rather than linear.1 Although this conforms to the finding 
of previous studies, there is no apparent theoretical reason to explain 
this fact. The relationship between the distribution of private welfare 
transfers and the independent variables does not have this character-
istic, i.e., equation (5.13) as compared to equation (5.lla). It is 
noted, furthermore, that "R'2 of (5.12) is the only one which is statisti-
cally significant (at 90 percent level). These low and insignificant 
values indicate that the level and distribution of private welfare 
transfers are not well modeled in our empirical specification, except in 
equation (5.12). In other words, the specification based upon the 
theoretical model developed has more power in explaining the level than 
the distribution of private welfare transfers. 
1R2 (or °R2) is often informally used as a goodness-of-fit statistic 
and to compare the validity of regression results under alternative 
specifications of the independent variables in the model. Strictly 
speaking, however, we have no statistical procedure to compare alterna-
tive specifications, because all our statistical results follow from the 
initial assumption that the model is correct. 
TABLE VII 
A TEST OF PUBLIC GOODS CHARACTER OF PRIVATE WELFARE INCOME TRANSFERS 
Equation Dependent Durbin-Watson 
Numbers Variable Constant INCOM PRICE BINI POP AGTRV MGTR N Statistics 
( 5.10) APWTR 16.41 0.002 46.86 - 7.51 0.01 0.004 70.05 -0.12 28 1.85 
(0.05) (0.51) (0.12) ( o. 03) ( 1. 09) (0.10) (0.78) 
( 5. lOa) APWTR -10.19 0.002 74.31 28.15 0.01 0.007 -62. 58 -0.13 28 1.82 
(0.03) (0.63) (0.19) (0.12) ( 1. 08) ( 0.19) (0.75) 
(5.11) MPWTR 2.86 o.oo - 3.03 0.18 -0.0003 - 0. 24 0.01 28 1. 72 
( 1. 51) o. 70 ( 1. 32) (0.13) ( 1. 24) (0.46) 
(5.lla) MPWTR - 3.21 0.00 3.53 1.02 -0.0003 - 0.44 0.09 28 1.87 
(1.74) (0.75) ( 1. 57) (0.69) (1.17) (0.95) 
( 5.12) APWTR -10.23 1. 51 - 2.34 0.80 0.31 -0.23 - o. 31 0.23* 28 1. 51 
(0.92) (1.75)* (0.48) ( 0. 65) (2.12)** (0.36) ( 0. 64) 
(5.13) MPWTR - 6.34 0.40 7.86 1.34 0.53 - o. 58 -0.01 26 2.09 
(0.42) (0.34) (1.10) (0.78) (0.69) ( 1. 03) 
t ratios are given in parentheses. 
* indicates coefficient is statistically significant at 90 percent level. 
**indicates coefficient is statistically significant at 95 percent level. 
N = number of observations. I.O w 
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Closer inspection of each independent variable in Table VII reveals 
that all but two coefficients, those of INCOM and POP in (5.12), are not 
significantly different from zero. Additionally, some are not of the 
expected signs. In the examination of the level of private welfare 
transfers--equations (5.10), (5.lOa), and (5.12)--the coefficient of 
INCOM is of the expected sign in all three equations, but the coeffi-
cient of PRICE is of the expected sign in (5.12) only. The income elas-
ticity exceeds unity (1.51) and is significantly different from zero. 
The price elasticity is rather high, -2.34, although not significantly 
different from zero. This conforms to the earlier results obtained by 
Reece (1979). It is not surprising that the price elasticity is not 
statistically significant, if we note that the measure of PRICE is 
obtained from cross-section, aggregate SMSA data. The BINI coefficient 
is not of the expected sign in (5.10}; but the MGTR coefficient is of 
the expected sign in all cases. The AGTRV coefficient is of the 
expected sign in (5.12} only. 
Finally, the POP coefficient is contrary to the expected sign in 
all cases, of which the one in (5.12} is also statistically significant. 
This allows us to make a statement that the coefficients of variables 
used in testing the interdependent utility and Nash conjectures either 
have the signs contrary to the expected, or have the expected signs but 
are not significantly different from zero. Thus, the interdependent 
utility and Nash conjectures hypotheses in the public goods theory do 
not receive much support from our results. For example, in (5.12} those 
variables intended to represent the absolute and relative consumption of 
potential recipients, AGTRV, BINI, and MGTR, have the correct sign but 
are insignificant. This suggests that the utility interdependence 
hypothesis receives little support from our results. POP has significant, 
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positive coefficient, 0.31. This may be due to a data problem, the 
observations we selected are all over a minimum size which is larger 
than the defined 11small-numbers case 11 ; or to the bargaining strength and 
skills between individuals, which will distort the efficient solution 
usually obtained in small-numbers case. Therefore, the relationship 
between public and private welfare transfers (AGTRV and APWTR) is 
examined. The coefficient of AGTRV is negative, but rather small, 
-0.23, and insignificant. Referring to the analytic chart described in 
Chapter V, all these results lead to the conclusion that private welfare 
transfers are not inefficiently provided. 
In the investigation of the distribution of private welfare 
transfers, (5.11), (5.lla), and (5.13), the coefficient of INCOM is of 
the expected sign in (5.11) only, but the coefficient of PRICE has the 
expected sign in all cases, although they are not significantly 
different from zero. For the variables used to test for interdependent 
utility, the results are contradictory and confusing. MGTR has the 
correct sign in all cases, BINI has the expected sign in (5.lla) and 
(5.13); AGTRV, however, has none. Among them none are significantly 
different from zero. Therefore, the utility interdependence hypothesis 
does not receive much support in the distribution equation either. In 
summary, it seems reasonable to conclude that as a result of the tests 
presented in this study, little or no support has been provided for the 
public goods theory of private welfare income transfers. 
Table VIII shows the simple correlation coefficients between var-
ious variables in the test of the public goods character of private 
welfare transfers. They are all low. Hence, there is no evidence of 
multicollinearity. In addition, the Durbin-Watson test was performed 
and the results indicate no serious serial correlation problem. 
TABLE VIII 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VARIOUS VARIABLES IN A TEST OF PUBLICS GOODS CHARACTER 
APWTR INC OM PRICE BINI POP AGTRV MGTR(Ck) MGTR(S1) .MPWTR (Ck) MPWTR(S1) 
APWTR 1.00 0.14 -0.05 0.03 0.23 0.16 0.21 -0.16 -0.04 0.05 
INCOM 1. 00 -0.04 0.19 -0.00 -0.33 0.12 -0.02 -0.05 0.09 
PRICE 1.00 0.39 -0.14 -0.08 -0.16 0.29 -0.22 0.29 
BINI 1.00 0.39 -0.11 -0.20 0.42 -0.09 0.22 
POP 1. 00 0.27 -0.17 0.22 -0.12 0.15 
AGTRV 1.00 0.49 -0.42 0.30 0.29 
MGTR(Ck) 1. 00 -0.95 -0.25 0.22 
MGTR(S1) 1. 00 0.25 -0.19 
MPWTR(Ck) 1.00 -0.99 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The primary objectives of this study were to assess public and pri-
vate income transfers in regard to technical and allocative efficiency 
in redistributing income. Technical efficiency refers to the effective-
ness of public or private transfers in achieving the goal of reducing 
income inequality. Allocative efficiency addresses the supply and 
public goods nature of private welfare transfers. 
To determine redistributive effects of public and private 
transfers, the effect on the income distribution was theoretically and 
empirically separated into the effects due to transfer rates, transfer 
progressivities, and underlying income distributions. To examine the 
public goods nature of private welfare transfers, the public goods 
theory of private giving was evaluated by investigating the implications 
of both Nash conjectures and utility interdependence hypotheses. In the 
existing literature, the relationship between private welfare transfers 
and public transfers has been utilized to test only the utility inter-
dependence hypothesis. In this study we have extended this relationship 
to the testing of the Nash conjectures hypothesis. Moreover, the public 
goods theory of private giving has been extended from emphasis on the 
amount of the giving to the distributional aspect of giving. 
We have found that the total redistributive effects of public 
income transfers are greater as compared to private income transfers, 
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in so far as both are captured in the data available to us, for public 
income transfers are larger in size and more pro-poor in distribution. 
For marginal redistributive effects, the income distribution before 
transfers, the public transfer rate and progressivity, and the inter-
action terms for public and private transfers were all found to be 
statistically significant. Among them, the interaction term for public 
transfers, the public transfer progressivity, and the income distri-
bution before transfers are the three relatively most important vari-
ables. Disaggregation reveals that, for either public or private 
transfers, the marginal effect of changes in the transfer rate on income 
distribution depends on the level of transfer progressivity, and vice 
versa. Moreover, the conditions for public transfers to have a further 
income-equalizing effect are much more strict than for private trans-
fers. Finally, the 11 i soeffect 11 curves for transfer rates and 
progressivities were derived, respectively. 
In regard to the public goods nature of private welfare transfers, 
the results obtained do not support the hypothesis of utility interde-
pendence in either the level or the distribution of private welfare 
transfers. The positively significant relationship between the number 
of donors and private welfare transfers, and the small and insignificant 
negative relationship between private welfare transfers and public 
transfers strongly suggest that the private welfare transfers examined 
in this study are not inefficiently supplied and do not exhibit signifi-
cant public goods characterisics. This conforms to the earlier results 
obtained by Reece (1979) and Sugden (1982). 
The unresolved problems with the income unit, income definition, 
income accounting period, and choice of ranking methodology all apply 
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to this study. In addition, although it is the best currently avail-
able, a sample of 28 SMSA's is rather small for the purpose of statisti-
cal testing. Similar to the approach employed by Hochman and Rodgers 
(1973), two income intervals were used in calculating distribution 
indices. Although this will result in an underestimation bias, we 
believe, like Benus and Morgan (1975, p. 211) that: " • the con-
sistent underestimation due to grouping the data •••• is unlikely to 
affect our results." Finally, cross-section aggregate data are expected 
to be troublesome. For example, the lump-sum of regular private contri-
butions, alimony, and child support could possibly distort the validity 
of testing for the public goods nature of private welfare transfers, for 
alimony and child support are not expected to be of a voluntary nature. 
We consider this a weakness of this study, although Reece (1979) has 
demonstrated that the separation of alimony and child support from 
regular contributions does not change the evidence of little support for 
the utility interdependence hypothesis. 
After due celebration of the weaknesses of data and limitations of 
method, it seems nevertheless possible to draw the following conclusions 
based on the findings of this study: 
(a) Although the total redistributive effects of public transfers 
are greater .than private transfers, and this study provides no rationale 
or evidence for reducing this effort, further reduction in income 
inequality could also be achieved through creative management of private 
transfers. In fact, for either public or private transfers, both the 
way transfers are targeted (transfer progressivity) and the level of 
transfers (transfer rate) are ·important in determining the redistribu-
tive effects. 
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(b) To compare public transfers with private transfers further, 
the "isoeffect" curves are critical. If combinations of current public 
transfer progressivity and private transfer progressivity lie above 
the relevant "isoeffect" curve, increases in private transfers relative 
to public transfers are suggested. Similarly, if combinations of cur-
rent public transfer rates and private transfer rates lie above the 
relevant "isoeffect" curve, an effort in making public transfers more 
pro-poor relative to private transfers is demanded. The implications 
are reversed if the combinations lie below the "isoeffect" curves. 
(c) There is no allocative inefficiency problem with the private 
welfare transfers examined in this study. Thus, although public sector 
action to increase private giving may be justified in terms of the mar-
ginal effect on technical efficiency there is not a "market failure" 
case for such action. 
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APPENDIX 
Let x be the income, F(x) be its distribution function and F1(x) be 
its first moment distribution. Let g(x) be a continuous function of x 
such that its first derivative exists and g(x) ) 0, and F1[g(x)] be its 
first moment distribution. In addition, denote by ng(x) and ng*(x) the 
elasticities of g(x) and g*(x) with respect to x, respectively: then we 
can state the following theorems and corollaries. 
THEOREM 1: The concentration curve for the function g(x) will lie 
above (below) the concentration curve for the function g*(x) if n9(x) is 
less (greater) than ng*(x) for all x ~ 0. 
CORROLLARY 1: The concentration curve for the function g(x) will 
be above (below) the egalitarian line if n~(x) is less (greater) than 
zero for all x > 0. 
COROLLARY 2: The concentration curve for the functiuon g(x) lies 
above (below) the Lorenz curve for the distribution of x if n9(x) is 
less (greater) than unity for all x > 0. 
k k 
THEOREM 2: If g(x) = E 9i(X) so that E[g(x)] = E E[gi(x)] 
i=l i=l 
where Eis the expected value operator, then 
k 
E [g(x)] F1 [g(x)] = E E[g;(x)] F1[g;(x)] 
i=l 
k 
COROLLARY 3: If g(x) = E gi(x) and Cg and Cgi are concentration 
i=l 
108 
indices of g(x) and gi(x), respectively, then 
k 
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